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FIDUCIARY CAPACITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE* 
 
JONATHON S. BYINGTON** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Bankruptcy law has fiercely competing policies.  A primary one is the debtor's 
fresh start.  Another is that discharge of debt is a selectively conferred privilege 
rather than an unlimited right.  This latter policy is manifested in part by the 
Bankruptcy Code's exceptions to discharge.  One exception involves a debt "for . . . 
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."1 In 2013, the Supreme Court 
addressed the meaning of the term "defalcation" and established a new, heightened 
mental standard based on the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessly.2 The 
meaning of the term "fiduciary capacity" is not clear. 
 This Article makes three contributions.  First, it compiles and evaluates the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the meaning of fiduciary capacity in the 
bankruptcy setting.  The most recent opinion on that term was issued in 1934 and 
provided limited guidance that was obscure and primarily in a negative form.3 Since 
the time of that decision, circuit and bankruptcy courts throughout the country have 
struggled to apply a consistent framework for determining whether modern legal 
relationships amount to a fiduciary capacity.  The second contribution is the 
categorization of the circuit split into four separate approaches.  The final 
contribution is an assessment of the adequacy of the current judicial approaches and 
the proposal of a new framework for determining if a relationship is a fiduciary 
capacity for purposes of the exception to discharge.  This is done by exploring the 
methods used to identify a fiduciary relationship under non-bankruptcy law, 
examining the problems with using those methods in a bankruptcy context, and 
suggesting the Supreme Court's 2013 opinion on defalcation justifies a rebalancing 
of the judicial construction of the statutory terms "defalcation" and "fiduciary 
capacity." 4 
 
 
 * © 2016 Jonathon S. Byington. I am grateful for the insightful comments and suggestions from Pippa 
Browde, Michelle Bryan, Larry Howell, Anthony Johnstone, Kristen Juras, Andrew King-Ries, Arthur Laby, 
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1 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
2 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013) ("We include as intentional not only 
conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper but also reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often 
treats as the equivalent. Thus, we include reckless conduct of the kind set forth in the Model Penal Code."). 
3 See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (providing that a fiduciary capacity cannot 
come from a debtor becoming chargeable ex maleficio). 
4 See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759–61 (construing "defalcation" to entail intentional or reckless conduct). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Bankruptcy law has fiercely competing policies.  A primary one is the debtor's 
fresh start.5 The fresh start is sacrosanct.  It is accomplished through the discharge 
of debt and an injunction preventing creditor efforts to collect debts that have been 
discharged.6 A rival policy is that discharge of debt is a selectively conferred 
privilege rather than an unlimited right.7 This policy is manifested through two 
types of discharge restrictions.  First, a discharge may be denied globally rendering 
all of a debtor's debts nondischargeable.8 Second, a debtor's specific, individual debt 
may be excepted from discharge either because the nature of the debt itself is 
important to society or the debt relates to a debtor's wrongful conduct.9 The tension 
between the fresh start policy and the discharge restrictions is a backdrop for every 
performance on the exception to discharge stage.  The featured shows are constantly 
changing because not all debts or debtors are the same.  
One of the exceptions to discharge, section 523(a)(4), relates to debts for 
"defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."10 The exception has two parts, a 
"defalcation" by a debtor who is acting in a "fiduciary capacity."11 In 2013, the 
Supreme Court resolved a long-standing three-way circuit split regarding the 
defalcation part of the test in Bullock v. BankChampaign ("Bullock").12 Bullock 
resolved the circuit split on the definition of defalcation by establishing a new, 
 
5 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (noting "[t]he principal purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor'") (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 
498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991)); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating the fresh start 
policy is a "public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who 
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life 
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt").  
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (enumerating effects of discharge of debt); id. § 727(a) (granting debtor discharge of 
debt, unless certain conditions exist); id. § 944(b) (governing discharge in the adjustment of municipalities' 
debts); id. § 1141(d) (governing discharge of debtor in certain reorganizations); id. § 1228(a) (providing for 
discharge of debt for family farmers or family fishermen with regular annual income); id. § 1328(a) 
(providing for discharge of debt for individuals with regular income).  
7 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (noting "a debtor has no constitutional or 'fundamental' right to a discharge 
in bankruptcy") (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445–46 (1973)); In re McNamara, 310 B.R. 664, 
668 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004) (stating "[b]ankruptcy is a privilege, not a right").  
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (listing situations where court may deny discharge of debt).  
9 See id. § 523(a)(2)(A) (providing denial of discharge of debt "for money, property, services, or an 
extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, 
or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition"); see also 
Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222 (1998) (stating that "[t]he various exceptions to discharge in 
§523(a) reflect a conclusion on the part of Congress that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of 
debts in these categories outweigh[s] the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start") (quoting Grogan, 498 
U.S. at 287); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (noting predecessor to section 523(a) 
"[was] not a compassionate section for debtors" because "it demonstrate[d] congressional judgment that 
certain problems . . . override the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start").  
10 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).  
11 Id. 
12 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013).  
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elevated standard based on the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessly.13 
Bullock's new definition significantly elevated the meaning of defalcation by 
imposing a mental standard requirement.14 It also raised the importance of what the 
term fiduciary capacity means and how Bullock's new defalcation standard affects 
competing bankruptcy policies.15 
The meaning of fiduciary capacity in section 523(a)(4) is not clear.  The 
Bankruptcy Code does not define it.  The current judicial framework for 
determining if a relationship amounts to a fiduciary capacity under section 
523(a)(4) is inadequate.  Supreme Court guidance on the term is limited, obscure, 
and primarily in a negative form.  It is also old.  Circuit and bankruptcy courts 
throughout the country have struggled to apply a consistent framework for 
determining whether modern legal relationships amount to a fiduciary capacity.  It 
is time to re-evaluate what a fiduciary capacity means, especially since the last 
Supreme Court opinion on it was issued in 193416 and society has changed 
significantly since that time.  The limited amount of scholarship in this area is either 
restricted to specific, individual relationships17 or primarily focuses on the term 
defalcation.18 To date, no scholarship has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of 
 
13 Id. at 1759 ("Where actual knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, we consider conduct as equivalent if 
the fiduciary 'consciously disregards' (or is willfully blind to) 'a substantial and unjustifiable risk' that his 
conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.").  
14 Id. at 1761 (remanding the case "to permit the court to determine whether further proceedings are 
needed and, if so, to apply the heightened standard that we have set forth").  
15 Id. (stressing importance of uniformity within federal courts). 
16 See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) ("[A] factor does not act in a fiduciary 
capacity; the statute 'speaks of technical trusts, and not those which the law implies from the contract.’”) 
(quoting Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844)). 
17 See Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. 
REV. 743, 769 (1997) (focusing on professional fiduciaries and stating "it makes sense to avoid the 
metaphysical debates over defalcation and fiduciary and instead to ask a relatively simple question: Did the 
debtor use his superior knowledge and power to take advantage of the creditor?"); see also Jennifer Liotta, 
ERISA Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy: Preserving Individual Liability for Defalcation and Fraud Debts Under 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 725, 758 (2006) (arguing an ERISA fiduciary should be a 
fiduciary capacity for purposes of section 523(a)(4)); Michael D. Sousa, Are You Your Produce Vendor's 
Keeper? The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act and § 523(a)(4) of the Code, 15 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 6 ART. 3 (Dec. 2006) (stating "an expansion of the meaning of 'fiduciary capacity' to encompass trusts 
created by statute offends the admonitions of the United States Supreme Court to strictly limit this provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code"); Michael D. Sousa, The Nondischargeability of Partners' Debts Under § 
523(a)(4): The Unresolved Collision Between the Bankruptcy Code and Partnership Law, 14 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 3 ART. 2 (2005) (asserting the "proper approach is to follow those courts which conclude that co-
partners do not act in a fiduciary capacity for purposes of determining the dischargeability of debts in 
bankruptcy").  
18 See Jonathon S. Byington, The Challenges of the New Defalcation Standard, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3 
(2014) (focusing on the challenges of applying the Bullock Court's new meaning of the term defalcation); 
Elbein, supra note 17, at 743 (claiming "[r]ecent cases have overturned a century and a half of interpretation 
. . . "); Andrea Johnson, The Defalcation Exception to Discharge: Should a Fiduciary's Mistake Prohibit a 
Discharge from Debt?, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 131 (2005) (recommending a "willful neglect" standard 
of intent); Matthew W. Knox, Persistent Confusion: The Circuit Split over the Exception to Discharge for 
Defalcation Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1078, 1110 (2008) (claiming a 
"willful neglect or recklessness" standard would be best); Bradley Kendall Mahanay, An Analysis of the 
Matter of Bennett and Its Effect on Non-Dischargeability of Debt for Defalcation While Acting In a 
2016] FIDUCIARY CAPACITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 5 
 
 
 
the term fiduciary capacity or developed a reliable framework for determining what 
it means.  This Article seeks to do so by making three contributions.  First, it 
compiles and evaluates the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the meaning of 
fiduciary capacity.  Second, it analyzes the circuit split on the meaning of fiduciary 
capacity and identifies four separate approaches that have developed.  Finally, it 
questions the adequacy of the current judicial approaches and proposes a new 
framework for determining if a relationship is a fiduciary capacity.  It does so by 
exploring the methods used to identify a fiduciary relationship under non-
bankruptcy law, examining the problems with using those methods in a bankruptcy 
context, and suggesting Bullock's opinion on defalcation justifies a rebalancing of 
the judicial construction of the statutory terms defalcation and fiduciary capacity. 
 
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: A NEGATIVE AND OBSCURE 
DESCRIPTION OF A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY 
 
Supreme Court guidance on the meaning of the term fiduciary capacity is 
limited, obscure, and primarily in a negative form.19 It is limited because there are 
only seven opinions that address whether a particular relationship is one where the 
debtor is acting in a fiduciary capacity.20 Not one of those opinions found a debtor 
 
Fiduciary Capacity, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 281, 292 (1994) (arguing a general partner should not be in a 
fiduciary capacity to limited partners for purposes of section 523(a)(4)); Alyssa Miller, "Some Portion of 
Misconduct": The Argument for a Negligence Standard for Excepting Discharge of Debts Incurred Through 
Defalcation, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 185, 204 (2011) (arguing a "negligence" standard should be 
applied); Peter M. Reinhardt and William G. Horlbeck, Defalcation While Acting In a Fiduciary Capacity: 
What Does It Mean?, 79 COLO. LAW. 1773 (Aug. 1995) (analyzing Tenth Circuit law on both defalcation 
and fiduciary capacity); Zvi S. Rosen, Discharging Fiduciary Debts, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 51 (2013) 
(examining the evolution and historical meaning of the term "defalcation").  
19 In addition to the opinions addressed in this Article, four other Supreme Court opinions reference the 
relevant statutes but do not address the meaning of a fiduciary capacity. See Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U.S. 183, 
186 (1907); Bayly v. Washington and Lee Univ., 106 U.S. 11, 12–13 (1882); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 
709 (1877); Wilmot v. Mudge, 103 U.S. 217, 218 (1880).  
20 See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844) (holding a factor who received the money of his 
principal was not a fiduciary); see also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 330 (1934) (holding 
that an auto dealer who obtained a loan and was a chattel mortgagor in possession of an automobile, and 
bound by covenant not to sell the automobile without the mortgagee's written consent, was not acting as a 
fiduciary when the dealer sold the automobile and failed to make prompt remittance of payment to the 
lender); Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 194 (1904) (holding there was no evidence that frauds perpetrated 
by defendants were committed by them in a fiduciary capacity when defendants purchased, under 
instructions of plaintiff, certain stocks, and opened an account with him, charged him with commission and 
interest, and credited him with amounts received as margins and then subsequently sold the stocks and 
converted them to their own use); Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 375 (1891) (holding that a debtor was 
not acting in a fiduciary capacity when he received delivery of $10,000 and signed an instrument under 
circumstances in which trust or confidence was reposed in him, but merely created a contract between a 
debtor and creditor); Noble v. Hammond, 129 U.S. 65, 67–68 (1889) (holding a produce dealer who had 
been requested by parties to collect money for them as an accommodation without compensation and to keep 
it until they called for it, proceeded to make such collection, and then deposited the proceeds to his own 
credit with his own funds and who before he paid it over was unexpectedly forced into bankruptcy, was not 
acting in a fiduciary character); Liebke v. Thomas, 116 U.S. 605, 608 (1886) (holding in a composition case 
an agreement to take care of and pay a promissory note when it became due and hold original maker 
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was acting in a fiduciary capacity.  The guidance is obscure because the Court has 
not explained what it means.21 It is negative because it consists of, or is 
characterized by, the absence rather than the presence of distinguishing features.  
The Court has said more about what a fiduciary capacity is not than what it is.  It 
has principally given indications through negative implication—describing 
something by what it is not.  This section explores the historical development of the 
term fiduciary capacity throughout the bankruptcy acts and the Court's 
jurisprudence on its meaning.22 
 
A.  1841 Bankruptcy Act and Related Decisions 
 
The Bankruptcy Act of 184123 contained the terms defalcation and fiduciary 
capacity, but they were located in the section that described who may be declared a 
bankrupt instead of the section that addressed when a bankrupt was not entitled to a 
discharge.24 Section 1 of the 1841 Act stated: 
 
All persons whatsoever . . . owing debts, which shall not have been 
created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as 
executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any 
 
harmless was not one of a fiduciary character); Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U.S. 676, 678 (1884) (holding a 
bankrupt's appropriating to his own use collateral securities deposited with him as security for payment of 
money or the performance of a duty, and his failure or refusal to return the same after the money had been 
paid or the duty performed, was not acting in a fiduciary character).  
21 See In re Turner, 134 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) (surveying some of the U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions and stating that "[t]he Court did not say just what 'special trusts' or 'technical trusts' are . . . 
What a 'technical trust' is does not readily appear. Courts of Appeal would later assume that a 'technical' trust 
is an 'express' trust . . . The assumption is plausible enough; but what the U.S. Supreme Court really meant 
by the term is open to question").  
22 The first federal bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, did not mention the terms defalcation 
or fiduciary capacity. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed in 1803). This act was 
primarily a creditor remedy against merchant debtors. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995).  
23 The 1841 Act was modeled after the Massachusetts Insolvency Law of 1838. CHARLES WARREN, 
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 70 (1935); Tabb, supra note 22, at 17. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the phrase to include "only technical trusts, and not trusts implied by law 
from contracts of agency or bailment." Woodward v. Towne, 127 Mass. 41, 42 (1879) (holding that an 
attorney that creates a debt is not acting as a fiduciary within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 or 
1867).  
24 Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) ("All persons . . . owing debts, 
which shall not have been created in consequences of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, 
administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity, who shall, by petition, . . . 
shall be deemed bankrupts within the purview of this act . . . "), with Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 
Stat. 440, 443–44 (1841) ("That every bankrupt . . . shall . . . be entitled to a full discharge from all his debts 
. . . And if any such bankrupt shall be guilty of any fraud or wilful concealment of his property . . . he shall 
not be entitled to any such discharge or certificate; nor shall any person, being a merchant, banker, factor, 
broker, underwriter, or marine insurer, be entitled to any such discharge or certificate, who shall become 
bankrupt, and who shall not have kept proper books of account, after the passing of this act; nor any person 
who, after the passing of this act, shall apply trust funds to his own use.").  
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other fiduciary capacity, . . . shall be deemed bankrupts within the 
purview of this act . . .25 
 
The Supreme Court viewed this section as excepting certain debts "from the 
operation of the act,"26 although it later characterized it as "exempt[ing] from 
discharge"27 the debts described. 
The most commonly-known feature of a fiduciary capacity comes from the 
1844 case of Chapman v. Forsyth.28 This feature is that a fiduciary capacity may 
derive from a special or technical trust.29 In Chapman, the Court held that "a factor 
who owes his principal money received on the sale of his goods," was not acting in 
a fiduciary capacity and therefore not within the Bankruptcy Act.30 During that time 
period, a factor was a professional middleman or consignee.31 The Court explained 
that Section 1 described relationships such as the defalcation of a public officer, 
executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, and that these were "not cases of 
implied but special trusts, and the 'other fiduciary capacity' mentioned, must mean 
the same class of trusts.  The act speaks of technical trusts, and not those which the 
law implies from the contract."32  
The concern identified by the Chapman Court was that if the Bankruptcy Act 
embraced a debt owed by a factor, "it [would] be difficult to limit its application" 
and "[s]uch a construction would have left but few debts on which the law could 
operate."33 In other words, the exception would swallow the rule.  The Court 
explained that "[i]n almost all the commercial transactions of the country, 
confidence is reposed in the punctuality and integrity of the debtor, and a violation 
of these is, in a commercial sense, a disregard of a trust.  But that is not the relation 
spoken of in the first section of the act."34 Interestingly, the Chapman Court was 
addressing Section 1, which defined the scope of who could be a debtor, by 
identifying certain debts that were not within the scope of the 1841 Bankruptcy 
 
25 Id. §1, 5 Stat. at 441. 
26 Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 207 (1844).  
27 Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708 (1877) (interpreting the term “fraud” under the Bankruptcy Act of 
1867).  
28 Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208. 
29 See id. at 208 (interpreting Bankruptcy Act of 184 section 1 to mean a fiduciary capacity may derive 
from technical trusts, and not from implied contractual trusts like that of a factor). 
30 Id. (describing how Bankruptcy Act of 1841 section 4 excludes factor as fiduciary debtor).  
31 See In re Turner, 134 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) (defining factor as "a professional 
middleman or cosignee").  
32 Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208 (determining Bankruptcy Act of 1841's language intended to include only 
technical trusts, not implied contractual trusts like that of a factor, within Act's definition of fiduciary 
debtor).  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
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Act.35 It was not addressing what type of debts were excepted from discharge.  
Subsequent case law however, caused this distinction to lose its significance.36  
 
B.  1867 Bankruptcy Act and Related Decisions 
 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was the first bankruptcy statute to contain the 
terms defalcation and fiduciary in a section addressing exceptions to discharge.37 
Section 33 of the 1867 Act stated "no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of 
the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any 
fiduciary character, shall be discharged under this act."38 
In Hennequin v. Clews,39 the Court held a bankrupt was not acting in a fiduciary 
character when the bankrupt held bonds as collateral on a line of credit it had 
extended as a lender and subsequently deposited the bonds with third parties to raise 
money for the bankrupt's own purposes.40 The Hennequin Court explained: 
 
The creditor who holds a collateral, holds it for his own benefit 
under contract. He is in no sense a trustee. His contract binds him 
to return it when its purpose as security is fulfilled; but if he fails to 
do so it is only a breach of contract, and not a breach of trust. A 
mortgagee in possession is bound by contract, implied if not 
expressed, to deliver up possession of the mortgaged premises 
when his debt is satisfied; but he is not regarded as guilty of breach 
of trust if he neglects or refuses to do so, but only of a breach of 
contract.41 
 
The Hennequin Court noted that English courts regarded "many transactions" as 
breaches of trust and observed that the "liberal construction made in favor of the 
certificate of discharge in this country is due to the peculiar modes and habits of 
business prevailing among our people."42 The concern in Hennequin was that a 
broad construction of the excepting clause would make it "include debts arising 
from agencies and the like," and "would leave but few debts upon which the law 
 
35 See id. (examining relationship between section 1 and fiduciary debtor). 
36 At a later time when interpreting the term fraud under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, the Supreme Court 
glossed over the distinction when it summarized the 1841 Act as follows: "The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 
exempted from discharge debts 'created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer, or as executor, 
administrator, guardian, or trustee, or while acting in any fiduciary capacity.'" Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 
708 (1877) (quoting Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208).  
37 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867) (repealed 1878).  
38 Id.  
39 111 U.S. 676 (1884). 
40 Id. at 682 (holding "[a] creditor who holds collateral . . . for his own benefit . . . is in no sense a 
trustee"). 
41 Id. at 682.  
42 Id. at 683.  
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could operate."43 Thus, the desire to preserve the fresh start policy was having an 
influential impact on the early construction of this exception to discharge.  
However, the discharge restrictions policy was also recognized by the Court at that 
time when, two years later, the Court acknowledged that not all debts were entitled 
to be discharged: 
 
It is of the essence of the bankrupt law that when the bankrupt has 
complied with all the conditions of the statute, and surrendered his 
property, he should be released from all his debts, except those of a 
fiduciary character or founded in fraud….44 
 
A negative feature of a fiduciary capacity is that it cannot come from a trust the 
law implies from a contract, such as trusts which form an element in every agency 
and in nearly all commercial transactions in the country.  In Noble v. Hammond,45 
the Court summarized Chapman's holding and noted that the provision containing 
the term "fiduciary character" in the 1867 act was "substantially a re-enactment of 
the provision of the act of 1841."46 The Noble Court described Chapman as follows: 
 
[Chapman] held that the cases enumerated in the act are cases not 
of implied but special trusts; that the phrase, 'in any other fiduciary 
capacity,' referred, not to those trusts which the law implies from 
the contract, and which form an element in every agency, and in 
nearly all the commercial transactions in the country, but to 
technical trusts; and hence that a factor who had sold the property 
of his principal, and had failed to pay over to him the proceeds, did 
not owe to him a debt created in a fiduciary capacity within the 
meaning of the act.47 
 
The Court later explained in Upshur v. Briscoe48 that the substance of the 
transaction governs over form.49 In Upshur, the Court held a relationship that "was 
merely the usual one of contract between debtor and creditor" was not within the 
scope of a "fiduciary character."50 The Upshur Court focused on substance over 
form and noted that even though the signed instrument in the case used the words 
"trust," "trustee," and "mandate," it did "not create a 'trust' in its technical sense, or 
make the debt of [the bankrupt] one created by him while acting in a 'fiduciary 
 
43 Id. (citing Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844)).  
44 Liebke v. Thomas, 116 U.S. 605, 607–08 (1886).  
45 129 U.S. 65 (1889). 
46 Id. at 69.  
47 Id.  
48 138 U.S. 365 (1891).  
49 See id. at 375.  
50 Id.  
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character.'"51 The Upshur Court also addressed the importance of the timing of the 
debt creation and the fiduciary relationship by holding that "debts created by the 
bankrupt 'while acting in any fiduciary character,' . . . apply only to a debt created 
by a person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was created."52 This timing 
concept was developed further by the Court in a subsequent case.53 
 
C.  1898 Bankruptcy Act and Related Decisions 
 
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 stated, "A discharge in bankruptcy 
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . (4) were 
created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting 
as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."54  
In Crawford v. Burke, the Court compared the 1898 Act language with the 1867 
Act language and stated that: 
 
[A] change in phraseology creates a presumption of a change in 
intent, and . . . Congress would not have used such different 
language in § 17 from that used in § 33 of the act of 1867, without 
thereby intending a change of meaning. The view generally taken 
by the bankruptcy courts has been the terms "officer" and 
"fiduciary capacity" extend to all the claims mentioned in 
paragraph 4, and are not confined to cases of defalcation.55 
 
Thus, Crawford considered a debtor acting either as an "officer" or "in any 
fiduciary capacity" as a required element in addition to a debtor's fraud, 
embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation.56 The Crawford Court continued: 
 
The intent of Congress in changing the language of the act of 1867 
seems to have been to restore the act of 1841, which, as already 
observed, extended the benefits of the law to every debtor who had 
not been guilty of defalcation as a public officer or in a fiduciary 
 
51 Id. (noting that the bankrupt has "[t]he right to use [the money] any way he thought proper was 
repugnant to the idea of any fiduciary relation to the money, for there was no obligation upon him to keep it 
separate from his own money, or to put upon it any marks of identification, or to invest it in any particular 
securities").  
52 Id. at 378.  
53 See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (stressing the importance of the debtor's 
trustee status arising before the act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose).  
54 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (1898) (repealed 1978).  
55 Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 190 (1904).  
56 See id. at 194 (holding "as there is no evidence that the frauds perpetrated by the defendants were 
committed by them in an official or fiduciary capacity, plaintiff's claim against them was discharged by the 
proceedings in bankruptcy").  
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capacity, the act of 1898 adding, however, to the excepted class 
those against whom a judgment for fraud had been obtained.57 
 
In the 1934 case of Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co.,58 the Court addressed the 
timing concept from Upshur and stated that a fiduciary capacity cannot come from 
the debtor becoming chargeable as a fiduciary ex maleficio (meaning, by some 
wrongdoing or malfeasance).59 The debtor must already be a fiduciary when the 
debt was created.60 In Davis, the Court relied upon its previous decision in 
Chapman to interpret the term fiduciary capacity under the 1898 Act: 
 
The meaning of these words has been fixed by judicial construction 
for very nearly a century. [Chapman], decided in 1844, is a 
decision to the effect that, within the meaning of a like provision in 
the Act of 1841, a factor does not act in a fiduciary capacity; the 
statute 'speaks of technical trusts, and not those which the law 
implies from the contract.' The scope of the exception was to be 
limited accordingly. Through the intervening years that precept has 
been applied by this court in varied situations with unbroken 
continuity.61 
 
The Davis Court also focused on the timing, explaining that "[i]t is not enough 
that, by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the contested debt arose, the 
bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio.62 He must have been a 
trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto."63 The Court also 
reconfirmed that the substance of the relationship governs over its form.64 
 
D.  Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978 and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
 
The Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978 dropped the language relating to "an 
officer" and stated the following in section 523(a)(4): "A discharge . . . does not 
discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . (4) for fraud or defalcation while 
 
57 Id. at 192. 
58 293 U.S. 328 (1934) (holding petitioner was not a trustee in a strict and narrow sense). 
59 Id. at 333 (finding "it is not enough that the act of wrongdoing from which the contested debt arose, the 
bankrupt is chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio"). 
60 Id. (citing Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 378 (1891)) ("The language would seem to apply only to a 
debt created by a person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was created."). 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 334 ("The substance of the transaction is this, and nothing more, that the mortgagor, a debtor, has 
bound himself by covenant not to sell the mortgaged chattel without the mortgagee's approval. The resulting 
obligation is not turned into one arising from a trust because the parties to one of the documents have chosen 
to speak of it as a trust.").  
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acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny."65 In 1979 in Brown v. 
Felsen, the Court noted that "[d]ischarge provisions substantially similar to § 17 of 
the [1898 Act] appear in § 523 of the new law."66 The Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 retained the identical language of 
the 1978 Act in section 523(a)(4).67 In 2013 in Bullock, the Court focused on the 
term defalcation in section 523(a)(4) and did not address the meaning of fiduciary 
capacity.68 
To recap, the Court has provided the following guidance on the meaning of the 
term fiduciary capacity:  
 
• The cases enumerated in the statute, the defalcation of a public officer, 
executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, are not cases of implied but 
special trusts, and the "other fiduciary capacity" mentioned must mean the 
same class of trusts.69 
 
•  A factor does not act in a fiduciary capacity; the statute speaks of 
technical trusts, and not those which the law implies from the contract.70 
  
• A fiduciary capacity cannot come from a relationship where a debtor is 
holding or possessing an item and the refusal to return the item is only a 
breach of contract.71 
 
• A fiduciary capacity cannot come from a trust the law implies from a 
contract,72 such as trusts which form an element in every agency and in 
nearly all commercial transactions in the country.73 
 
65 Bankruptcy Law Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(4)). 
66 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 129 n.1 (1979) (addressing res judicata principles).  
67 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 523, 119 
Stat. 54 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).  
68 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013) (involving a debtor who was a non-
professional trustee of an irrevocable living trust). In Bullock, the Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings without addressing whether the debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity. See also Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A., (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating "[t]he parties do not 
dispute that the judgment debt arose from conduct that occurred while Bullock was acting in a fiduciary 
capacity (i.e., while he was the trustee of his father's trust)").  
69 See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844) (interpreting the term fiduciary capacity to include 
special or technical trusts, but not implied trusts).  
70 See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (excluding implied trusts from fiduciary 
capacity). 
71 See Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208 (holding "a factor who owes his principal money received on the sale of 
his goods, is not a fiduciary debtor within the meaning of the act"); Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U.S. 676, 682 
(1884) (finding mortgagee in refusal to follow express or implied contract to give up premises is not guilty 
of breach of trusts, but breach of contract).  
72 See Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208 (observing how "[t]he act speaks of technical trusts, and not those which 
the law implies from the contract").  
73 See Noble v. Hammond, 129 U.S. 65, 69 (1889).  
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• Using the term "trust" or "trustee" in a contract with a debtor does not 
create a fiduciary capacity.74 The substance of a transaction "is not turned 
into one arising from a trust because the parties to one of the documents 
have chosen to speak of it as a trust."75 
 
• A fiduciary capacity cannot come from the debtor becoming chargeable 
as a fiduciary ex maleficio (meaning, by some wrongdoing or 
malfeasance).76 The debtor must already be a fiduciary when the debt was 
created.77 
 
• A fiduciary capacity cannot come from the usual contractual 
relationship between a debtor and creditor, even if it was created under 
circumstances in which trust or confidence was reposed in the debtor.78 
 
The Court has never explained exactly what a special or technical trust is.  Nor 
has it issued an opinion in which it determined that the facts of the case amounted to 
a fiduciary capacity.  From a purely textualist perspective, it is odd that the terms 
"any fiduciary character"79 in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and "any fiduciary 
capacity"80 in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 were construed in a manner that ignores 
the unspecified adjective "any." There is a legitimate concern that the exception to 
discharge should not be construed so broadly that the exception swallows the rule.  
However, the fresh start policy should not be overemphasized in a way that ignores 
 
74 See Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 375 (1891) (explaining that "[t]he statement in the paper signed by 
Andrews that Briscoe accepts the 'trust,' . . . and the statement in the paper signed by Annie M. Andrews that 
she accepts the appointment of Briscoe 'as her trustee,' do not create a 'trust' in its technical sense, or make 
the debt of Briscoe one created by him while acting in a 'fiduciary character'").  
75 Davis, 293 U.S. at 334.  
76 See id. at 333 (holding "[i]t is not enough that, by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the contested 
debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before 
the wrong and without reference thereto").  
77 See Upshur, 138 U.S. at 378 (stating "the language would seem to apply only to a debt created by a 
person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was created"). This suggests the term fiduciary capacity 
would exclude trusts created ex post as a remedial measure, such as constructive trusts and resulting trusts.  
78 See id. at 375 (holding "[t]he relation created was merely the usual one of contract between debtor and 
creditor. Within the meaning of the exception in the bankruptcy act, a debt is not created by a person while 
acting in a 'fiduciary character' merely because it is created under circumstances in which trust or confidence 
is reposed in the debtor, in the popular sense of those terms").  
79 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867) (repealed 1878) (stating in section 33 
that "no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, 
or while acting in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged under this act").  
80 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (1898) (repealed 1978) (stating in section 
17 that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . 
. (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or 
in any fiduciary capacity").  
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the discharge restriction text promulgated by Congress under the bankruptcy clause 
of the Constitution.81  
The Court has construed the words "fiduciary capacity" to have some type of 
connection to a trust.  Interestingly, non-bankruptcy scholarship has observed that 
under old English law, the word "fiduciary" historically described situations that fell 
short of a trust relationship, meaning "those situations which are in some respects 
trust-like but are not, strictly speaking, trusts."82 
The Court's jurisprudence indicates that a usual debtor-creditor relationship is 
insufficient to create a fiduciary capacity.83 If all relationships were lined up on a 
spectrum with a commonplace debtor-creditor relationship on one end and the 
Court's nebulous special or technical trust on the other, there would be a large 
number of multifarious relationships located in between.  The Court's seven 
opinions on the meaning of fiduciary capacity were issued between 1844 and 1934.  
Since that time, significant changes have occurred to the economy, credit, and the 
types of relationships that debtors have with others.  All sorts of new relationships 
have developed since the year 1934.84 Circuit courts have struggled with both the 
application and translation of what a fiduciary capacity means to new relationships 
that involve those who eventually become a debtor under bankruptcy law. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS ON THE MEANING OF 
FIDUCIARY CAPACITY 
 
The Supreme Court's guidance on the meaning of a fiduciary capacity has 
proven inadequate for the circuit courts to apply consistently to the ever-growing 
universe of debtor relationships.  This Section identifies areas in which the circuit 
courts are in substantial agreement on the meaning of a fiduciary capacity in section 
523(a)(4).  It then evaluates the circuit court split on the meaning of a fiduciary 
capacity and identifies four separate approaches that have developed. 
 
81 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States").  
82 L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 71–72 n.11 (1962) (noting that an early 
instance of the use of the word by a judge was in Bishop of Winchester v. Knight (1717) 1 P. Wms. 406, 407 
per Cowper L.C., involving a proceeding by a landlord for an account of ore dug by a tenant: "it is stronger 
in this case by reason that the tenant is a sort of fiduciary to the lord, and it is a breach of the trust which the 
law reposes in the tenant, for him to take away the property of the lord").  
83 See Upshur, 138 U.S. at 375 (holding "[t]he relation created was merely the usual one of contract 
between debtor and creditor. Within the meaning of the exception in the bankruptcy act, a debt is not created 
by a person while acting in a 'fiduciary character,' merely because it is created under circumstances in which 
trust or confidence is reposed in the debtor, in the popular sense of those terms").  
84 Consider for example the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, the Model Business 
Corporation Act, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974.  
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A.  The Circuit Similarities 
 
1.  Judicial Construction of Exceptions to Discharge 
 
Even though the burden of proof is on the creditor to prove exceptions to 
discharge by "the ordinary preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,"85 the Supreme 
Court has established a "well-known guide"86 and "long-standing principle"87 that 
exceptions to discharge "should be confined to those plainly expressed."88  
Many circuit courts have gone a step further and required a pro-debtor/anti-
creditor construction.  For example, in the Fifth Circuit, exceptions to discharge 
"are generally to be 'narrowly construed . . . against the creditor and in favor of the 
bankrupt.'"89 In the Second Circuit, "exceptions to discharge are to be narrowly 
construed and genuine doubts should be resolved in favor of the debtor."90 The 
Eleventh Circuit noted "courts generally construe the statutory exceptions to 
discharge in bankruptcy liberally in favor of the debtor and recognize that the 
reasons for denying a discharge must be real and substantial, not merely technical 
and conjectural."91 The Seventh Circuit construes exceptions to discharge "strictly 
against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor."92 Thus, many of 
the circuits take similar approaches and construe exceptions to discharge in favor of 
the debtor. 
 
2.  Scope of Fiduciary Capacity is a Question of Federal Law 
 
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "fiduciary 
capacity" as used in section 523(a)(4).  The circuits that have addressed the issue 
uniformly agree that the meaning of "fiduciary capacity" in section 523(a)(4) is a 
question of federal law.93 But the circuits look to state law to determine the nature 
 
85 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (holding "[w]e are unpersuaded by the argument that the 
clear-and-convincing standard is required to effectuate the 'fresh start' policy of the Bankruptcy Code").  
86 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998).  
87 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013).  
88 Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915).  
89 Boyle v. Abilene Lumber, Inc. (In re Boyle), 819 F.2d 583, 588 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Murphy & 
Robinson Inv. Co. v. Cross (In re Cross), 666 F.2d 873, 879–80 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also Century 21 
Balfour Real Estate v. Menna (In re Menna), 16 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Exceptions to discharge are 
narrowly construed in furtherance of the Bankruptcy Code's 'fresh start' policy."); Caspers v. Van Horne, 823 
F.2d  1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[E]vidence presented must be viewed consistent with congressional intent 
that exceptions to discharge be narrowly construed against the creditor and liberally against the debtor, thus 
effectuating the fresh start policy of the Code.")  
90 Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2006).  
91 Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1994).  
92 Crosswhite v. Ginter (In re Crosswhite), 148 F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir. 1998).  
93 See, e.g., In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 688 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (stating "[t]he fiduciary relationship 
necessary for a denial of discharge under § 523(a)(4) is determined by federal law"); Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. 
Regan (In re Regan), 477 F.3d 1209, 1211 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mangum v. Siegfried (In re 
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of the relationship involving the debtor, including for example, whether a trust was 
established.94 The Second Circuit explained the interplay between federal and state 
law as follows: 
 
Although the precise scope of the defalcation exception is a 
question of federal law, its application frequently turns upon 
obligations attendant to relationships governed by state law. For 
example, state law can be an important factor in determining 
whether someone acted in a fiduciary capacity under Section 
523(a)(4). [citations omitted] On the other hand, there are federal 
limits on the ability of state law to expand the effects of this 
provision. See, e.g., In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 
1994) ("If . . . a fiduciary is anyone whom a state calls a fiduciary . 
. . states will have it in their power to deny a fresh start to their 
 
Siegfried), 5 Fed. Appx. 856, 859 (10th Cir. 2001)) (stating "[w]hile 'the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
under § 523(a)(4) is determined under federal law,' state law is relevant to this inquiry"); Guerra v. 
Fernandez-Rocha (In re Fernandez-Rocha), 451 F.3d 813, 816 (11th Cir. 2006) (looking first to federal cases 
for the meaning of fiduciary capacity); Gupta v. E. Idaho Tumor Inst., Inc. (In re Gupta), 394 F.3d 347, 349 
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th Cir. 1993)) 
(stating "[t]he scope of the concept of fiduciary under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) is a question of federal law"); In 
re Frain, 230 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating "[t]he existence of a 'fiduciary relationship' is a matter 
of federal law. It bears emphasis that not all fiduciary relationships qualify under the Bankruptcy Code."); 
Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating 
"the precise scope of the defalcation exception is a question of federal law"); Harrell v. Merch.'s Express 
Money Order Co., 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curium) (recognizing "[t]he definition of 'fiduciary' for 
purposes of § 523(a)(4) is controlled by federal common law"); Tudor Oaks Ltd. P'ship v. Cochrane (In re 
Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 
Cir. 1996)) (stating "[w]hether a relationship is a 'fiduciary' one within the meaning of section 523(a)(4) is a 
question of federal law"); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1185 (referencing Runnion v. Pedrazzini (In re Pedrazzini), 
644 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating "[w]hether a relationship is a 'fiduciary' one within the meaning of 
section 523(a)(4) is a question of federal law"); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 
249, 251 n.2 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating the question of who is a fiduciary "is one of federal law").  
94 See, e.g., In re Fahey, 482 B.R. at 688 ("The content of federal law is informed by principles articulated 
in state law, including those that define essential attributes of a trust relationship."); Arvest Mort. Co. v. Nail 
(In re Nail), 680 F.3d 1036, 1040 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding "[i]t is now well settled that a state statute may 
create the fiduciary relationship required by § 523(a)(4)"); Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re 
Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Not all persons treated as fiduciaries under state law are 
considered to 'act in a fiduciary capacity' for purposes of federal bankruptcy law."); Kubota Tractor Corp. v. 
Strack, (In re Strack), 524 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 2008) (looking to state law for guidance to determine 
whether a trust was established); In re Regan, 477 F.3d at 1211 n.1 ("While 'the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship under § 523(a)(4) is determined under federal law,' state law is relevant to this inquiry.") 
(quoting In re Siegfried, 5 Fed. Appx. at 859); In re Gupta, 394 F.3d at 350 ("The scope of the concept of 
fiduciary under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) is a question of federal law; however, state law is important in 
determining whether or not a trust obligation exists.") (quoting In re Bennett, 989 F.2d at 784); In re Hayes, 
183 F.3d at 166–67 ("Although the precise scope of the defalcation exception is a question of federal law, its 
application frequently turns upon obligations attendant to relationships governed by state law."); In re Lewis, 
97 F.3d at 1185 ("Whether a fiduciary is a 'trustee in that strict and narrow sense," is determined in part by 
reference to state law.") (citations omitted); Quaif v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 1993) (analyzing a 
Georgia statute to determine if there was a statutory fiduciary duty); In re Johnson, 691 F.2d at 251 n.2 
("State law is merely a factor in the equation used to determine whether the fiduciary capacity requirement is 
satisfied as a matter of federal law, using federal standards.").  
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debtors by declaring all contractual relations fiduciary"). As a 
general matter, therefore, federal law sets the outer boundaries of 
the defalcation exception, while state law may, through lesser or 
greater regulation of fiduciary obligations, affect the application of 
the provision.95  
 
Thus, the circuit courts have found that even though state law is commonly 
essential to the analysis, state law is not conclusive.  The circuits have generally 
agreed that many relationships that are characterized as fiduciary in nature under 
state law will not automatically amount to a fiduciary capacity under section 523.  
One reason for this different treatment is that bankruptcy policies differ from those 
under state law. 
 
3.  An Express Trust Gives Rise to a Fiduciary Capacity 
 
Under non-bankruptcy law, an express trust is a fiduciary relationship with 
respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create 
that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties 
to deal with it for the benefit of another.96 The person who holds property in trust is 
the trustee and the person for whose benefit property is held in trust is the 
beneficiary.97 According to the Restatements, a trust involves three elements: (i) a 
trustee (ii) one or more beneficiaries, and (iii) trust property.98 Under the Uniform 
Trust Code, 
[a] trust may be created by: (1) transfer of property to another 
person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime or by will or other 
disposition taking effect upon the settlor's death; (2) declaration by 
the owner of property that the owner holds identifiable property as 
trustee; or (3) exercise of a power of appointment in favor of a 
trustee.99  
 
95 In re Hayes, 183 F.3d at 166–67. See also Texas Lottery Comm'n v. Tran (In re Tran), 151 F.3d 339, 
343 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The question whether a state statute creates the type of fiduciary relationship required 
under § 523(a)(4) is one of federal law. To make this determination a federal court must nevertheless look to 
state law-here, to the statute purporting to create a fiduciary relationship and to any regulations promulgated 
in regard thereto-to discern whether the supposed fiduciary relationship possesses the attributes required 
under § 523(a)(4), which brings us to the case at hand.").  
96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (defining "trust"); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (same).   
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (listing elements of a trust); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (same). 
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 3 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).  
99 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2000) (amended 
2010). 
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Except for the trustee's duty to keep the beneficiaries informed of administration 
and the trustee's obligation to act in good faith, a trustee's fiduciary duties arise from 
the terms of the trust.100 
Every circuit101 has recognized that a debtor acting as a trustee under an express 
trust is a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).102 Although there are minor 
variations arising from applying different state law, there is significant agreement 
among the circuits on the requirements to establish an express trust.103 
 
100 See UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 8, gen. cmt. (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2000) (amended 2010) (explaining all elements of article 8 may be "[o]verridden in the terms of the trust" 
except for trustee's duty to act in good faith and to inform beneficiaries of administration). 
101 Except the District of Columbia Circuit and Federal Circuit.  
102 See Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761,769 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating 
its threshold inquiry was whether a fiduciary obligation was owed through the presence of an "express 
trust"); Kubota Tractor Corp. v. Strack, (In re Strack), 524 F.3d 493, 497 n.6 (4th Cir. 2008) ("Here, the 
dispute concerns only whether an express trust was created, which, as both parties acknowledge, is clearly 
sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship for the purposes of § 523(a)(4)."); Eberhart v. First Am. Title 
Ins. Co. (In re Eberhart), 124 Fed. Appx. 672, 674 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that a relationship "created an 
express trust" by failing to act in his fiduciary capacity owed to trust beneficiaries as a trustee); Hunter v. 
Philpott, 373 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2004) ("We have interpreted the term 'fiduciary' in § 523(a)(4) to refer 
only to trustees of 'express trusts.'"); Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 313 F.3d 9, 17 n.3 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(deciding a case where a debtor was an attorney and co-trustee of an express trust and stating "[i]t is 
undisputed that [the debtor] is a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4)"); Andy Warhol Found. for Visual 
Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating "the defalcation exception is not 
limited to express trusts"); Texas Lottery Comm'n v. Tran (In re Tran), 151 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding "[u]nder § 523(a)(4), 'fiduciary' is limited to instances involving express or technical trusts"); R.E. 
America, Inc. v. Garver (In re Garver), 116 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding "[w]e believe that this 
definition . . . necessarily implies the existence of an express or technical trust relationship"); Lewis v. Scott 
(In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating "the fiduciary relationship must be one arising 
from an express or technical trust"); Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 
1996) (stating "an express or technical trust must be present for a fiduciary relationship to exist under § 
523(a)(4)); Quaif v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting "[i]n the early judicial interpretation 
of the predecessors to § 523(a)(4), the courts seemed to include the voluntary, 'express' trust within the scope 
of 'fiduciary capacity'"); Bloemecke v. Applegate, 271 F. 595, 599 (3d Cir. 1921) (comparing different 
versions of the bankruptcy act and concluding that "Congress doubtless had in mind that the courts had 
construed the term 'fiduciary' as meaning an express, technical trust, and by omitting those words from the 
act of 1898 it must have intended to extend the class coming within the meaning of 'fiduciary capacity'").  
103 See In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 688 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (finding an express trust requires "an explicit 
declaration of trust, a clearly defined trust res, and an intent to create a trust relationship") (quoting In re 
Olinger, 160 B.R. 1004, 1014 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1993)); In re Thompson, 458 B.R. 504, 508 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2011) (providing "[a]n express trust is one 'created with the settlor's express intent, usually declared in 
writing'") (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1650 (9th ed. 2009)); In re Sawaged, Nos. 10–058, 08–
10344, 08–01304, 2011 WL 880464, at *3 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining that "[e]xpress trusts 
are those trust relationships which are intentionally entered into by the parties. An express trust may involve 
a formal declaration of trust or a situation where the intention of the parties to form a trust relationship may 
be inferred by the surrounding facts and circumstances") (quoting In re Steele, 292 B.R. 422, 427 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 2003)); In re Strack, 524 F.3d at 498–99 (applying Virginia law and finding "'an express trust is based 
on the declared intention of the trustor,' manifested either in writing or through the parties' actions" and that 
"[a]ll that is necessary is the 'unequivocal' intent 'that the legal estate [be] vested in one person, to be held in 
some manner or for some purpose on behalf of another'") (quoting Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. (In re 
Dameron), 155 F.3d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1998)); Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Blaszak (In re Blaszak), 
397 F.3d 386, 391–92 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding an express trust has four requirements: "(1) an intent to create 
a trust; (2) a trustee; (3) a trust res; and (4) a definite beneficiary") (citing In re Grim, 293 B.R. 156, 166 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003)); Quaif, 4 F.3d at 953 (describing an express trust as "a voluntary trust, created by 
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4.  A Technical Trust May Come From Many Different Sources  
 
Under non-bankruptcy law, fiduciary duties may come from many different 
sources such as the agreement of the parties via express or implied contractual 
terms or through some type of legislative or judicial decree.104 These sources 
commonly confer power to, or impose obligations upon, the fiduciary. 
Most circuits have held that a fiduciary capacity requires an "express or 
technical trust."105 The circuits have looked to many different sources to find a 
technical trust.  For example, in the Eighth Circuit, "[t]rusts satisfying § 523(a)(4) 
can be created by state statute or by common law, as well as by contract."106 In the 
Ninth Circuit, a "trust within the meaning of § 523(a)(4) may arise by virtue of state 
case law."107 The First Circuit recognized that "in analyzing common law technical 
trusts, courts typically examine state law to determine if it imposes fiduciary 
obligations on the relevant party."108  
 
contract") (citing In re Turner, 134 B.R. 646, 650 (Bankr. N.D. Okl. 1991)); E.A. Schlecht v. Thornton (In re 
Thornton), 544 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding "[t]he general characteristics of an express trust are 
1) sufficient words to create a trust; 2) a definite subject; and 3) a certain and ascertained object or res").  
104 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON 425 
(1993); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995); Robert 
H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039 (2011).  
105 See In re Fahey, 482 B.R. at 687 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (holding "the debt must result from a 
fiduciary's defalcation under an 'express or technical trust'") (quoting In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 77 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2005)); see also Guerra v. Fernandez-Rocha (In re Fernandez-Rocha), 451 F.3d 813, 816 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (recognizing the term fiduciary refers to technical trusts and that courts seemed to include the 
voluntary, express trust created by contract within the scope of 'fiduciary capacity'") (citing Quaif, 4 F.3d at 
953); Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(stating "the attorney-client relationship, although usually not involving a technical trustee or express trust, 
has long been understood to be a fiduciary relationship within the meaning of the defalcation exception"); 
Harrell v. Merch.'s Express Money Order Co. (In re Harrell), 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curium) 
(holding that "under [§ 523(a)(4)], a fiduciary is limited to instances involving express or technical trusts"); 
In re Tran, 151 F.3d at 343 (holding that "[u]nder § 523(a)(4), 'fiduciary' is limited to instances involving 
express or technical trusts"); In re Garver, 116 F.3d at 179 (holding that "[w]e believe that this definition . . . 
necessarily implies the existence of an express or technical trust relationship"); Tudor Oaks Ltd. P'ship v. 
Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 
1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996)) (stating "[t]he fiduciary relationship must be one arising from an express or 
technical trust"); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1185 (stating "the fiduciary relationship must be one arising from an 
express or technical trust") (citing Ragsdale v. Haller, 780 F.2d 794, 795 (9th Cir. 1986)); In re Young, 91 
F.3d at 1371 (stating "an express or technical trust must be present for a fiduciary relationship to exist under 
§ 523(a)(4)").  
106 Rechetar Sys., Inc. v. Thompson (In re Thompson), 686 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Barclays 
Am./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1985)).  
107 In re Stanifer, 236 B.R. 709, 718 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (stating California case law gives rise to the 
"core requirements of a trust and to the type of fiduciary relationship contemplated within the meaning of § 
523(a)(4)"). See also Ragsdale v. Haller (In re Ragsdale), 780 F.2d 794, 796–97 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding 
that "[i]f state law makes clear that a partner necessarily is a trustee over partnership assets for all purposes, 
then that partner is a fiduciary within the narrow meaning of §523(a)(4)").  
108 In re Fahey, 482 B.R. at 688 (quoting In re Sullivan, 217 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998)) 
(noting a technical trust may arise under statute or common law).  
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When relying upon a statute to create the trust, the circuits have developed 
similar but slightly different tests.  Some of these tests incorporate aspects of the 
Supreme Court's guidance.  For example, the First Circuit has found that "[w]here 
the basis for the existence of a technical trust is statutory, the statute must '(1) 
define the trust res, (2) spell out the trustee's fiduciary duties, and (3) impose a trust 
prior to and without references to the wrong that created the debt.'"109 In the Fifth 
Circuit, "[s]tatutory trusts . . . can satisfy the dictates of § 523(a)(4).  It is not 
enough, however, that a statute purports to create a trust . . . to meet the 
requirements of § 523(a)(4), a statutory trust must (1) include a definable res and 
(2) impose 'trust-like' duties."110 The Eighth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's 
requirements noting "[i]t is now well settled that a state statute may create the 
fiduciary relationship required by § 523(a)(4)."111 In the Sixth Circuit, "a statute 
may create a trust for purposes of § 523(a)(4) if that statute defines the trust res, 
imposes duties on the trustee, and those duties exist prior to any act of 
wrongdoing."112 The Ninth Circuit has found fiduciary relationships imposed by 
statute may cause a debtor to be considered a fiduciary under section 523(a)(4) "if 
the statute: (1) defines the trust res; (2) identifies the fiduciary's fund management 
duties; and (3) imposes obligations on the fiduciary prior to the alleged 
wrongdoing."113 Thus, there is significant agreement among the circuits that 
fiduciary capacities under section 523(a)(4) may come from many different sources. 
 
B.  The Circuit Split 
 
Despite their agreement on trusts, the circuits have struggled to consistently 
apply the Supreme Court's description of a fiduciary capacity.  One bankruptcy 
court observed that "[r]educing these varied precedents to an intelligible rule is not 
easy"114 and another concluded it was an issue that "[m]uch judicial ink has been 
spilled on" and the reported case law "is hopelessly divided."115 There are multiple 
 
109 Id. at 688 (quoting In re Bologna, 206 B.R. 628, 632 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997)).  
110 In re Tran, 151 F.3d at 342–43 (noting that one trust-like duty was that "a trustee refrain from spending 
trust funds for non-trust purposes").  
111 Arvest Mortgage Co. v. Nail (In re Nail), 680 F.3d 1036, 1040 (8th Cir. 2012).  
112 Bd. of Trustees of the Ohio Carpenters' Pension Fund v. Bucci (In re Bucci), 493 F.3d 635, 641 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (highlighting Michigan's Building Contract Fund Act established a fiduciary obligation on a 
contractor when a payment is paid to the contractor, not when a contractor misappropriates the funds).  
113 Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering whether 
fiduciaries under ERISA also constitute fiduciaries under section 523(a)(4)).  
114 In re Turner, 134 B.R. 646, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) (discussing difference in opinions among 
Court of Appeals and lower courts on topic of express trusts).  
115 In re Bayer, 521 B.R. 491, 509 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2014) (acknowledging Georgia case law has held 
that a debtor's status as a director or officer does not, by itself, create a fiduciary relationship between the 
director or officer and the corporation, whereas Illinois case law is still unclear on the issue as "it is not 
possible to describe definitively the state of § 523(a)(4)"). See also In re Heilman, 241 B.R. 137, 160 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 1999) ("It is an understatement to say that the courts are divided on the meaning of 'fiduciary 
capacity' for purposes of nondischargeability of debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).").  
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levels of splits throughout the circuits on what type of relationships are a fiduciary 
capacity under section 523(a)(4). 
The circuits disagree on the treatment of distinct, individual relationships.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has found the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") plan fiduciaries are fiduciaries for purposes of section 
523(a)(4) because the ERISA statute "(1) defines the trust res; (2) identifies the 
fiduciary's fund management duties; and (3) imposes obligations on the fiduciary 
prior to the alleged wrongdoing."116 But the Sixth Circuit has held the definition of 
fiduciary capacity in section 523(a)(4) "does not match the definition of an ERISA 
fiduciary."117 Another example is an attorney-client relationship where the debtor is 
an attorney and the creditor is a client.  The Tenth Circuit has held that a fiduciary 
capacity under section 523(a)(4) requires more than a general attorney-client 
relationship.118 But the Second Circuit has determined that the attorney-client 
relationship, without more, constitutes a fiduciary relationship under section 
523(a)(4).119 
The disagreement among the circuits goes beyond pairings of opposite views on 
individual relationships.  The circuits are divided on the meaning of a special or 
technical trust.  There is not a commonly-known meaning of the term "technical 
trust." Black's Law Dictionary, which contains entries for over 117 different types 
of trusts, contains a single cross-reference to the term "passive trust" but does not 
independently define the term technical trust.120 Neither the Second nor Third 
Restatements of Trust contain the term technical trust.121 It is absent from the 
Uniform Trust Code.122 In addition to there being no uniform understanding on the 
meaning of a technical trust, the circuits also disagree on what aspect of a fiduciary 
relationship is the most important.  Many of the circuits agree that they are looking 
for "trust-type obligations," but they disagree on what those obligations look like.123 
 
116 In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 1190 (considering whether fiduciaries under ERISA also constitute 
fiduciaries under section 523(a)(4)).  
117 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 641 (stating definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is "broader than the 
common-law definition, and does not turn on formal designations, such as who is the trustee”).  
118 See Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1372 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he majority of 
courts that have considered the issue have applied the above principles to require more than attorney-client 
relationship alone to establish a fiduciary relationship for purposes of § 523(a)(4)."). See also R.E. America, 
Inc. v. Garver (In re Garver), 116 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding "[t]he attorney-client relationship, 
without more, is insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for defalcation under § 
523(a)(4)").  
119 See Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding "the attorney-client relationship, without more, constitutes a fiduciary relationship within the 
meaning of Section 523(a)(4)").  
120 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1747 (10th ed. 2014) (defining the term passive trust as "[a] trust in 
which the trustee has no duty other than to transfer the property to the beneficiary").  
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 5 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).  
122 See UNIF. TRUST CODE (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2000) (amended 
2010). 
123 See, e.g., LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 784–85 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating "the 
'technical' or 'express' trust requirement is not limited to trusts that arise by virtue of a formal trust 
22 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 1 
 
 
 
The circuits have split into at least four separate approaches for determining if a 
relationship is a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4). 
 
1.  Restrictive Approach Requiring Traditional Express Trust Elements Such As a 
Trust Res and Trustee 
 
The most restrictive approach focuses on traditional express trust elements such 
as requiring the relationship to have a trust res, a trustee, and an appropriate timing 
of when the fiduciary obligations were created.  The Ninth and Tenth Circuits are 
good examples of this approach.  These courts are flexible on the source of where 
these elements come from, but nonetheless still require some of the traditional trust 
elements.  For example, these courts have analyzed whether the trustee requirement 
was met in a variety of different contexts, such as when the debtor was a corporate 
officer,124 partner,125 joint venturer,126 attorney,127 licensed real estate broker,128 
former spouse,129 or insurance agent.130 They have looked to whether there was a 
trust res arising from a California contractor statute,131 a fee an attorney received,132 
 
agreement, but includes relationships in which trust-type obligations are imposed pursuant to statute or 
common law"); see also In re Stanifer, 236 B.R. 709, 714 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the technical 
trust requirement "includes relationships in which trust-type obligations are imposed pursuant to statute or 
common law").  
124 See Cal-Micro, Inc. v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 329 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
"California case law has consistently held that while officers possess the fiduciary duties of an agent, they 
are not trustees with respect to corporate assets").  
125 See Ragsdale v. Haller (In re Ragsdale), 780 F.2d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding "California has 
made all partners trustees over the assets of the partnership"); see also Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 
1182, 1185 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining if state law imposed trust obligations on partners that were 
substantially similar to those imposed on trustees).  
126 See Lewis v. Short (In re Short), 818 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating "[s]hort had a duty to act as 
trustee for the affairs of the joint venture").  
127 See Banks v. Gill Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. (In re Banks), 263 F.3d 862, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding "[w]hen 
he placed his client's funds into his trust account, he became his client's fiduciary"); Fowler Bros. v. Young 
(In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1372 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding a New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 
"does not place an attorney in the position of a trustee" even though it applies to the instant case); In re 
White, 271 B.R. 213 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (holding a Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct "puts the 
attorney in the position of a trustee").  
128 See Otto v. Niles (In re Niles), 106 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[b]ecause Niles 
collected rents for the Ottos in her capacity as a licensed real estate broker . . . and was required either to pay 
those funds directly to the Ottos or to hold them in a trust fund account in accordance with the Ottos' 
instructions, she was the trustee of an express trust").  
129 See Teichman v. Teichman (In re Teichman), 774 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding "no estate 
was conveyed to the husband as a trustee").  
130 See In re Kelley, 215 B.R. 468, 474 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (evaluating an Oklahoma statute and 
concluding it "identifies as a trust res all the insurance charges or premiums that an administrator collects for 
an insurer").  
131 See Runnion v. Pedrazzini (In re Pedrazzini), 644 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1981) (determining "[t]he 
California statutes do not create the basic elements of a trust. No res is defined . . . ").  
132 See In re Bigelow, 271 B.R. 178, 188 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that "[s]ince there were no 
trust funds involved in Bigelow's attorney-client relationship with Stephens, theirs was not a 'fiduciary' 
relationship within the narrow meaning of § 523(a)(4)"). 
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a Texas construction fund statute,133 a transaction involving a real estate broker,134 a 
Colorado construction lien statute,135 Oklahoma common law,136 a commercial 
relationship,137 and an Oklahoma general corporation act.138 Finally, the timing of 
when the alleged trust arose was decisive in a situation where a limited liability 
company was not formed and an operating agreement was not signed,139 where a 
California contractor statute was at issue,140 a case involving withdrawal liability 
under ERISA,141 and obligations of a former spouse came from a property 
settlement agreement.142 This approach of requiring traditional express trust 
elements is the most restrictive view. 
 
2.  Broad Approach Abandoning Trust Concepts 
 
The broadest approach completely ignores trust concepts.  The Second Circuit 
has construed the Supreme Court's requirement that there be a "special trust" as not 
requiring a trust "in the modern sense of a legal relationship where a party (the 
trustee) is the legal owner of property beneficially held on behalf of others, but 
more generally of the class of relationships in which special trust is bestowed upon 
a party."143 The Second Circuit found "certain relationships not constituting actual 
 
133 See In re Munton, 352 B.R. 707, 715 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (finding "[t]he Texas statute clearly defines 
the trust res, i.e. construction payments made to a contractor 'under a construction contract for the 
improvement of specific real property'").  
134 See In re Honkanen, 446 B.R. 373, 381 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (finding Honkanen did not hold any 
property in trust and "[i]n the absence of a trust res, a fundamental requirement to form a trust, there was no 
express, technical or statutory trust formed" and thus no fiduciary capacity).  
135 See Mangum v. Siegfried (In re Siegfried), 5 Fed. Appx. 856, 859 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating the statute 
"expressly designates the funds received by the contractor as trust funds to be held for payment to 
subcontractors") (opinion adopted and published by Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan (In re Regan), 477 F.3d 
1209, 1211 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007)).  
136 See In re Seay, 215 B.R. 780, 787 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (finding that in addition to failing to prove 
the existence of an express or technical trust, Holaday failed to establish the existence of a trust res).  
137 See In re Burton, No. 09–15177, 2010 WL 3422584, at *5–6 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2010) 
(highlighting that the alleged trust res was not titled in the debtor's name).  
138 See In re Hill, 390 B.R. 407, 412 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008) (finding "the Corporation Act does not 
sufficiently and explicitly create a trust or define a trust res").  
139 See In re Utnehmer, 499 B.R. 705, 717 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013) (questioning "how a fiduciary duty that 
may arise in an LLC that does not come into existence until sometime in the future" satisfies the requirement 
that the fiduciary duty arise before any alleged wrongdoing takes place).  
140 See Runnion v. Pedrazzini (In re Pedrazzini), 644 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that the statutes 
in question "operate only after an act of wrongdoing has occurred").  
141 See Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Moxley, 734 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2013) (reasoning 
that "[b]ecause withdrawal liability does not arise until the employer ceases to have an obligation to 
contribute to the plan, it cannot be considered an unpaid contribution under the collective bargaining 
agreement").  
142 See Teichman v. Teichman (In re Teichman), 774 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
"[a]lthough the debtor husband in this case may now be classified as a constructive trustee pursuant to 
[California statutes], a constructive trust would be imposed only after the defendant has defaulted. This is 
not sufficient to render the debt non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(4)").  
143 Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1999).  
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trusts are within the defalcation exception."144 It held an attorney-client relationship, 
without more, is a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).145 Although it refused 
to "disaggregat[e] the fiduciary relation into component pieces," it noted "the 
attorney-client relationship entails one of the highest fiduciary duties imposed by 
law" and explained "[t]he fiduciary obligation owed by an attorney to his client 
extends to all aspects of the attorney-client relationship, including the means by 
which the relationship is created, as evidenced from the extensive regulation of 
attorney-client fee arrangements."146 Thus, this broad view does not require a trustee 
or trust res. 
 
3.  Fiduciary Capacity Based On Control 
 
Another approach has been to look for "trust-like" duties with a special focus on 
control.  In the Fourth Circuit, debtors who were in control of the supervision and 
handling of the day-to-day operations of a corporation were deemed to be acting in 
a fiduciary capacity.147 The Fifth Circuit looks at "whether the alleged fiduciary 
exercises actual control over the alleged beneficiary's money or property."148 In a 
different case, the Fifth Circuit focused on a managing partner's control over a 
partnership as creating a greater duty of loyalty than is normally required and noted 
that "the issue of control has always been the critical fact looked to by the courts in 
imposing this high level of responsibility."149 On another occasion, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that an officer of a corporate general partner who was entrusted with the 
management of a limited partnership, and who exercised control over the limited 
partnership, owed a fiduciary duty to the partnership under section 523(a)(4).150 The 
Fifth Circuit explained that "it is not only the control that the officer actually exerts 
over the partnership, but also the confidence and trust placed in the hands of the 
controlling officer, that leads us to find that a fiduciary relationship exists."151 The 
court focused on the debtor's "near-complete control over both tiers of the entity" 
and that the board had entrusted him "with the sole and plenary authority over the 
day-to-day management of the partnership" including controlling "the hiring, 
 
144 Id.  
145 See id. at 170 (rejecting "the view that the attorney-client relationship is of a fiduciary nature for 
purposes of Section 523(a)(4)"). 
146 Id. at 168–70. 
147 See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Ellison (In re Ellison), 296 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 
where one party, by their personal decisions, failed to make required payments for trustee corporation while 
running its day-to-day operations, party had breached its fiduciary duty).  
148 Texas Lottery Comm'n v. Tran (In re Tran), 151 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the statute in 
question "fails to entrust the ticket sales agent with the state's money for safekeeping").  
149 LSP Inv. P'ship v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779, 789 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the requirements 
of section 523(a)(4) were met because under Texas law, a managing partner owed limited partners the 
highest fiduciary duty recognized by law).  
150 See FNFS, Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood), 637 F.3d 615, 622 (5th Cir. 2011).  
151 Id.  
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evaluation, promotion, and termination of [partnership] employees."152 Thus, the 
alleged fiduciary's control has been the primary focus of one approach. 
 
4.  Fiduciary Capacity Based On Ascendancy from Knowledge or Power 
 
The final approach looks at whether the debtor was put in an ascendant position 
based on the debtor's knowledge or power.  The Seventh Circuit153 has held a 
fiduciary capacity may come from "a difference in knowledge or power between the 
fiduciary and principal which . . . gives the former a position of ascendancy over the 
latter."154 The rationale is that this inequality of relation "justif[ies] the imposition 
on the fiduciary of a special duty, basically to treat his principal's affairs with all the 
solicitude that he would accord to his own affairs."155 The court explained that there 
are several reasons a fiduciary may have more knowledge: 
 
The fiduciary may know much more by reason of professional 
status, or the relation may be one that requires the principal to 
repose a special confidence in the fiduciary; both factors are present 
in the case of a lawyer-client relation and also the relation between 
director and shareholder or managing partner and limited partner. 
Or the principal may be a child, lacking not only knowledge but 
also the power to act upon it. These are all situations in which one 
party to the relation is incapable of monitoring the other's 
performance of his undertaking, and therefore the law does not treat 
the relation as a relation at arm's length between equals.156 
 
Having substantially more power than another may give rise to a fiduciary 
capacity in the Seventh Circuit.157 In one case, the Seventh Circuit found a debtor 
who was a chief operating officer holding 50% of the shares and who could not be 
removed for cause without his consent possessed a position of considerable 
ascendancy over the other shareholders.158 The court focused on the debtor's 
 
152 Id. at 523.  
153 The Seventh Circuit has recognized additional grounds for finding a fiduciary relationship under 
section 523(a)(4) even where there is no substantial inequality in knowledge or power. Follett Higher Educ. 
Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2011).  
154 In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing fiduciary relation imposing duty 
prior to breach and fiduciary relation which does not); see also In re Frain, 230 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding the source of a debtor's fiduciary relationship was his "substantial ascendancy" over two 
shareholders).  
155 In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d at 1116 (indicating nondischargable debts under section 523(a)(4) have 
typically included conventional trusts or relationships of ascendency).  
156 Id.  
157 See In re Frain, 230 F.3d at 1018 (determining inequality of power was a source of fiduciary 
relationship). 
158 See id. at 1017 (noting, however, that the natural advantage a debtor may have over other shareholders 
in terms of knowledge of a corporation's finances from being responsible for the day-to-day business 
decisions of a corporation is "not sufficient in itself to establish a position of ascendancy").  
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"significant freedom to run the corporation as he saw fit, including oversight of 
such items as salary and distributions of corporate cash flow" as well as the lack of 
a system of "checks and balances."159 The court later explained that it was a 
"substantial concentration of power under the corporation's internal structure [that] 
created a fiduciary duty."160 In another case, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
disparity in power governing segregated funds created an "economic relation" that 
was fiduciary in nature.161 Hence, this approach considers the alleged fiduciary's 
ascendancy from knowledge or power as the source of a fiduciary capacity under 
section 523(a)(4). 
 
III.  REFORMING THE MEANING OF FIDUCIARY CAPACITY 
 
The four-way circuit split is an indication that the Supreme Court's guidance on 
the meaning of fiduciary capacity is inadequate.  It also demonstrates the broad 
variety of relationships that are alleged to be fiduciary in nature.  A usable 
framework to provide guidance to courts is needed.  This Section seeks to provide 
that framework.  It does so by examining the definition of a fiduciary relationship 
under non-bankruptcy law and two methods used to recognize one.  It identifies 
problems with using those methods in a bankruptcy context to determine if a 
relationship is a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).  It then develops a 
framework that provides a principled and consistent basis for determining if a 
relationship is a fiduciary capacity in a bankruptcy context.  It concludes by 
suggesting the Bullock Court's opinion on defalcation justifies a rebalancing of the 
judicial construction of the statutory terms "defalcation" and "fiduciary capacity." 
 
A. Non-Bankruptcy Law's Elusive Definition of a Fiduciary Relationship and the 
Two Methods Used To Identify One 
 
Fiduciary relationships are pervasively entwined throughout modern social and 
economic systems.162 Fiduciary duties are imposed by non-bankruptcy law in a 
 
159 Id. at 1018 (determining debtor's power was crucial to establishing a fiduciary relationship).  
160 Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding a 
fiduciary relationship from the effects of the internal corporate structure).  
161 See Nelson v. McGee (In re McGee), 353 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2003) (comparing formal separation 
and ownership rules in economic relation to management of a client's funds by a lawyer).  
162 See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 971 (2013) (explaining the 
pervasiveness as follows: "Lawyers, doctors, investment advisors, and other professionals are fiduciaries of 
their clients. Trustees, executors, and agents are fiduciaries of their beneficiaries, testators, and principals. 
Directors, officers, and trustees of corporations, hospitals, universities, and charities are fiduciaries of the 
legal entities under their charge. Parents and guardians are fiduciaries of their children and wards"); see also 
Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal 
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991) (noting "[f]amiliar forms of fiduciary relationships 
include trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, corporate director/officer-corporation, and partner-partnership, 
although courts have emphasized that these categories are not exclusive"); Robert A. Kutcher, Breach of 
Fiduciary Duties, in BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION 1 (David A. Soley, et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005); D. Gordon 
Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2002) (observing 
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wide variety of relationships, including those involving trustees,163 agents,164 estate 
representatives,165 partners,166 corporate officers, directors, and majority 
shareholders,167 members of limited liability companies,168 stock brokers or 
 
that "[c]ourts routinely impose fiduciary duties in myriad relationships, including trustee-beneficiary, 
employee-employer, director-shareholder, attorney-client, and physician-patient . . . In addition, courts 
regularly impose fiduciary obligations ad hoc in relationships where one person trusts another and becomes 
vulnerable to harm as a result"); Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 157, 159–60 (2013) (explaining that "[f]iduciary law is not generally considered to be a separate and 
distinct body of law in the United States. Rather, many different areas of law employ fiduciary law 
principles. Among the most common are agency law, trust law, corporate law (and the law of other business 
entities), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and professional practice. Each implements the 
principles of fiduciary law in different ways. Thus, it is difficult to make very many claims about fiduciary 
law in general").  
163 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) 
(defining trust as "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property"); Himel v. Cont'l Ill. Bank & Trust Co. 
of Chi., 596 F.2d 205 (11th Cir. 1979) (noting plaintiff's claim was founded on the premise "the Bank had 
mismanaged the trust estate and breached its fiduciary duty"); IAM Stock Ownership Inv. Trust Fund v. E. 
Air Lines, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Del. 1986) (holding that a "[t]rustee has an affirmative—indeed, a 
high fiduciary—duty"); Busby v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 484 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ark. 1979) ("[The 
trustee of an express trust] is subject to what is probably the highest standard of fiduciary duty known to the 
law."); First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Cross, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) (citing Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301–03 (Utah 1978) (noting "the trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the 
interest of the trustor").  
164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (defining agency as "the fiduciary relation which 
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act"); Wilcox v. St. Croix Labor Union Mut. Homes, 
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 924 (D.V.I. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 399(g), 400, 401) 
(noting an agent is liable to his principal for damages if he breaches his fiduciary duty); Sierra Pac. Indus. v. 
Carter, 163 Cal. Rptr. 764, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (reasoning that "[a]n agent bears a fiduciary relationship 
to his or her principal which requires . . . disclosure of all information in the agent's possession relevant to 
the subject matter of the agency"). 
165 See Alford v. Thibault, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 829 n.2 (2013) ("An executor owes a fiduciary duty to 
the beneficiaries of an estate."); Probate Court of City of Warwick ex rel. Lawton v. Bank of Am., N.A., 813 
F. Supp. 2d 277, 301 (R.I. 2011) (citing Estate of Wickes v. Stein, 107 R.I. 260 (1970)) ("An executor owes 
a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries under a will, . . . his fiduciary duty requires that the executor act at all 
times in the best interests of the beneficiaries as a whole."); In re Tomlin, 266 B.R. 350, 354 (N.D. Tex. 
2001) (holding that an executor owes a fiduciary duty to pay taxes to the IRS). 
166 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 21 (1914) (stating a partner is accountable as a fiduciary for "any transaction 
connected with the formation, conduct, or liquation of the partnership"); id. § 404 (1997) (defining fiduciary 
duties a partner owes to the partnership as duty of loyalty and duty of care); Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon 
Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 385, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), (indicating that general partners owe a 
fiduciary duty to limited partners); Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 898–99 (N.D. 
Ind. 2002) (noting that Indiana courts impose a fiduciary duty on partners in accordance with "traditional 
partnership principles"); Georgou v. Fritzshall, No. 93 C 997, 1995 WL 692019, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 
1995) ("It is well settled that partners owe a fiduciary duty to one another."). 
167 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30 and 8.60 (1984) (noting board of director members have a duty to 
corporation to act in good faith and in corporation's best interest); Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. 798, 822–23 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Matter of Reading Co., 711 F. 2d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Delaware law recognizes 
that not only do directors and officers 'stand in a fiduciary relationship to their corporation and 
stockholders[,]' but 'a majority shareholder, or a group of shareholders who combine to form a majority, has 
a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its minority shareholders.'"); see also Casden v. Burns, 306 Fed. 
Appx. 966, 969 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. I., 353 B.R. 324, 344 (D.D.C. 2006); 
In re United States Sugar, Corp. Lit., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Levin v. Kozlowski, 846 
N.Y.S.2d 37, 3 (App. Div. 1st Dep't. 2001). 
28 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 1 
 
 
 
investment advisors,169 accountants,170 physicians,171 real estate agents and 
brokers,172 auctioneers,173 and actors with discretionary authority under ERISA.174 
Fiduciary duties often relate to property or power that has been entrusted to a 
fiduciary or the performance of services by a fiduciary.175 Non-bankruptcy law is 
helpful in understanding what a fiduciary relationship is and how it is different than 
other types of relationships. 
 
1.  The Definition of a Fiduciary Relationship under Non-Bankruptcy Law 
 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary relationship as "[a] relationship in 
which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of another on matters within 
the scope of the relationship."176 Some non-bankruptcy scholars have taken the 
position that a generic explanation of a fiduciary relationship is simply 
undefinable.177 Others have attempted to define it.  For example, one scholar simply 
 
168 See Zimmerman v. Crothall, 62 A.3d 676, 702 n.145 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 
No. 7304–VCL, 2012 WL 5949209, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2012)) (holding "managers and managing 
members of an LLC do owe fiduciary duties as a default matter"); Kyle v. Apollomax, LLC, 987 F. Supp. 2d 
519, 523 (D. Del. 2013) (stating "the fiduciary duties of any person bound by an LLC agreement 'may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability agreement'"); In re D'Amore, 472 
B.R. 679, 687 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012); Purcell v. S. Hills Invs., LLC, 847 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind. App. 2006); 
McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606, 615 (Ind. App. 2002); Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited 
Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1, 16 (1995).  
169 See Nathanson v. Polycom, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 966, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Gallier v. Woodbury Fin. 
Servs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67448 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2015); Siegal v. Gamble, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
104702 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015); Groom v. Bank of Am., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2374, at *10 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 9, 2012); Pipino v. Onuska, No. 4:11CV00129, 2011 WL 1603134, at *4 (N.D. Ohio 2011); Escalon v. 
World Grp. Secs, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107196, at *16–17 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2008); First Am. 
Disc. Corp. v. Jacobs, 324 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1012 (2001); Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 741–52 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that, because stockbrokers "act as agents for buyers and seller of securities," 
stockbrokers owe a fiduciary duty to clients).  
170 See Iacurci v. Sax, 139 Conn. App. 386, 409 (2012) (citing Peterson v. H & R Block Tax Servs., 971 F. 
Supp. 1204, 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding relationship between accountant and client is not fiduciary in 
nature).  
171 See Mays v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, No. 14-0788, 2015 WL 6181508, at *9 (W. Va. Oct. 20, 
2015) (extending fiduciary duty to physicians); Jameson v. Desta, 215 Cal. App. 1144, 1164 (2013) (same).  
172 See FV 1 Inc. v. Goodspeed, 974 N.E.2d 664, 671 (Ohio 7th Dist. 2012) (extending fiduciary duty to 
real estate agents); see also Dube-Forman v. D'Agostino, 61 A.D.3d 1255, 1257–58 (N.Y. 2009) (same); 
Saiz v. Horn, 668 N.W.2d 332, 336 (S.D. 2003) (stating real estate agents have fiduciary duties); Barfield v. 
Hall Realty, Inc., 232 P.3d 286, 291 (Colo. App. 2010) (same).  
173 See United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 198, 217 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding auctioneers have fiduciary duties).  
174 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A) and 1104(a)(1) (1988); Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 725 
F.3d 406, 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2291 (2014); Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 
1080 (9th Cir. 2009); Sonoco Products Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 372–74 (4th Cir. 
2003) 
175 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 107 (Oxford University Press 2011) [hereinafter FRANKEL, 
FIDUCIARY LAW] (stating fiduciary duties aim at reducing entrustors' risks in two main areas).  
176 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 744 (10th ed. 2014); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a 
(1979).  
177 See Sealy, supra note 82, at 78 (stating "[t]he word 'fiduciary,' we find, is not definitive of a single class 
of relationships to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply. . . It is obvious that we cannot proceed any 
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described a fiduciary as "a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another 
person."178 Another defined a fiduciary relationship as one "in which one party (the 
fiduciary) exercises discretionary power over the significant practical interests of 
another (the beneficiary)."179 A different scholar observed that "while the 
definitions of fiduciaries are not identical, all definitions share three main elements: 
(1) entrustment of property or power, (2) entrustors' trust of fiduciaries, and (3) risk 
to the entrustors emanating from the entrustment."180 Others have observed that 
"[t]hree indicia mark the fiduciary relationship: discretion, vulnerability, and 
trust."181 One scholar explained: "[w]hat is a fiduciary duty? It is not so much a 
special type of duty as it is a duty imposed in a special kind of relationship."182 
 
further in our search for a general definition of fiduciary relationships"); see also Deborah A. DeMott, 
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 908 (1988) [hereinafter 
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor] (observing "[l]egal commentators have made several attempts to develop 
general justifications for fiduciary obligation; that is, to describe in a comprehensive and analytic fashion 
those aspects of relationships that justify imposition of fiduciary constraints . . . In part, fiduciary obligation 
eludes theoretical capture because it arises in diverse types of relationships . . . The scope of the fiduciary's 
obligation, as well as the obligation's precise formulation, necessarily varies with the context of the 
relationship"); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and 
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 935–36 (2006) [hereinafter DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty] 
(observing that "[t]he difficulty is that the characteristics of even the standard or conventional fiduciary 
relationships—these include trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, lawyer-client, guardian-ward, director-
corporation, and partner-fellow partner and partnership—are too varied to enable one to distill a single 
essence or property that unifies all in any analytically satisfactory way"); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
104, at 438 (claiming there is nothing "special about fiduciary relations" and that "[s]earching for the right 
definition of a fiduciary duty is not a special puzzle . . . there is no subject here, and efforts to unify it on a 
ground that presumes its distinctiveness are doomed"); Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law's "Holy Grail": 
Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 941 (2011) ("Rather than 
defining fiduciary law by the more rigid and rule-oriented scheme of contract law or other common law 
schemes giving rise to civil obligation, fiduciary law ought to be understood by reference to the broad 
postulates that underlie it and give it meaning."); Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: 
Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 478, 482 n.22 (2005) (noting that under the 
Commonwealth, "[t]he fiduciary relationship has been said to defy definition" and "the features or indicia 
giving rise to a fiduciary relationship are nowhere exhaustively defined").  
178 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949); see also Paul D. Finn, 
Contract and the Fiduciary Principle, 12 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 76, 84 (1989) (stating "[t]he true 
nature of the fiduciary principle is revealed in this. It originates, self-evidently, in public policy. To maintain 
the integrity and utility of relationships in which the (or a) role of one party is perceived to be the service of 
the interest of the other, it insists upon a fine loyalty in that service. The fiduciary is not to use his position or 
the power or opportunity it gives him to serve an interest other than his beneficiary's—be this his own or a 
third party's").  
179 Miller, supra note 162, at 1011; see also Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 1, 4 (1975) (stating the two core elements of a fiduciary relationship are "[f]irst, the fiduciary must have 
scope for the exercise of discretion, and, second, this discretion must be capable of affecting the legal 
position of the principal").  
180 FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 175, at 4.  
181 Ethan J. Leib, et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 706–08 (2013) 
(explaining that "although the three indicia noted above define the fiduciary relationship and consequent 
fiduciary liability, the quantum of discretion, trust, and vulnerability used to trigger fiduciary obligation 
varies according to type of relationship").  
182 Velasco, supra note 162, at 159; see also Miller, supra note 162, at 978 (stating "[t]he conventional 
position is that fiduciary duties arise upon the establishment of a fiduciary relationship").  
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Another scholar described fiduciary obligations as "a device that enables the law to 
respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one person's 
discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's 
relationship with another."183 Another proposed that "[t]he defining or determining 
criterion should be whether the plaintiff (or claimed beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) 
would be justified in expecting loyal conduct on the part of an actor and whether the 
actor's conduct contravened that expectation."184 Yet, another described a fiduciary 
duty as "an obligation to refrain from self-interested behavior that constitutes a 
wrong to the beneficiary as a result of the fiduciary exercising discretion with 
respect to the beneficiary's critical resources."185  
Although there may be no clear, universally-accepted definition of a fiduciary 
relationship, there are two generally established ways fiduciary relationships are 
identified: the status-based method and the context-based method.  Many courts 
start with the status-based method to see if a relationship is one that is routinely 
treated as fiduciary and if it is not, will then turn to the context-based method to 
determine if fiduciary status is warranted in the particular case.  The circuit split on 
the meaning of fiduciary capacity in a bankruptcy context illustrates how both 
methods of identification are used.  Each will be addressed in turn. 
 
2.  The Status-Based Method 
 
The status-based method recognizes fiduciary relationships based on the 
position of a person in relation to another depending on conventionally recognized 
categorical forms—meaning those that are in a form generally accepted and 
prescribed, such as trustee-beneficiary, attorney-client, and principal-agent.186  
The Ninth Circuit uses a status-based approach to determine if a relationship 
amounts to a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).  It takes a new relationship 
and compares it to an express trust to see if the new relationship fits within this 
same conventionally-recognized category.  That is why the Ninth Circuit's decisions 
focus on the elements of an express trust such as whether the party was in the 
position of a trustee or if the relationship involved some type of property that could 
be categorized as trust res. 
 
183 DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 177, at 915.  
184 DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 177, at 936.  
185 Smith, supra note 162, at 1407; see also D. Gordon Smith and Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 613 (2014) (explaining both legal and non-legal constraints on discretion and observing 
non-legal constraints include "market forces, reputational concerns, industry customs, social norms, and 
moral values").  
186 See Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 744 (10th ed. 2014). For example, the 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act defines the term "fiduciary" to include "a trustee under any trust, expressed, 
implied, resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee in 
bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, 
public officer, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust or estate." Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act § 1(1) (1922).  
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3.  The Context-Based Method 
 
The context-based method recognizes fiduciary relationships based on attributes 
of the relationship—meaning those that arise from a factual context that indicates 
fiduciary characteristics, such as the placement of trust or confidence in another, 
vulnerability or dependence on another, substantial disparity in knowledge, and the 
ability to exert influence.187  
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits both use a context-based approach to determine 
if a relationship amounts to a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).  These 
courts look at the factual characteristics of the particular relationship instead of the 
status to determine if it equates to a fiduciary capacity.  The Fifth Circuit has 
focused on whether the alleged fiduciary had the characteristic of control.  The 
Seventh Circuit targets the alleged fiduciary's ascendancy over another with a focus 
on the attributes of knowledge and power.  Although the characteristics differ 
(control or ascendancy), the analysis under this approach determines if a 
relationship is fiduciary in nature by evaluating whether it has certain types of 
characteristics. 
Both the status and context-based methods have shortcomings when used to 
determine if a relationship is a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).  As 
explained below, the status-based method is flawed and should not be used.  The 
context-based method is too broad because it can effectively identify every 
fiduciary relationship but is unable to distinguish among degrees of fiduciality.  The 
problems with each method will be addressed in turn. 
 
B. The Problem With Using The Status-Based Method To Determine Fiduciary 
Capacity in Section 523(a)(4) 
 
The status-based method is inflexible, distinguishes relationships on a basis that 
is not justified, and goes against the underlying policy of section 523(a)(4).  Other 
than identifying the significant concern of preventing the discharge exception from 
applying to all debts, the Supreme Court has not explained why it selected a special 
or technical trust as the point of comparison for meeting the fiduciary capacity 
requirement.  Presumably, the Supreme Court was itself using a status-based 
method to separate various relationships.  During the time period between 1844 and 
1934, an express trust with a trustee and beneficiary was a historic and generally 
accepted form of a fiduciary relationship.188 It was the prototypical fiduciary 
 
187 See Fiduciary Relationship, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 744 (10th ed. 2014).  
188 See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT et al., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS 24 (5th ed. 2006) (stating "the 
trust was already present in America in colonial times"); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT et al., THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 31 (3d ed. 2007) (stating "[by] the end of the eighteenth century, when trusts came 
into more common use in America, the English system had been well developed, and was adopted in 
substantial entirety by the American colonial and early state chancellors. The first state reports show that 
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relationship.  Choosing an express trust as the litmus test category would be natural.  
However, the only justification given by the Supreme Court did not relate to why 
trusts were selected instead of a different category.  Instead, it was a concern that 
the term fiduciary capacity be construed to prevent the exception's application to all 
debts.189 Although that reasoning makes sense, it is not a valid justification to 
continue exclusive use of the trust category as the only accepted status if other 
categories also effectively prevent the section 523(a)(4) discharge exception from 
applying to all debts. 
Another problem with the status-based method is that it undermines the reason 
section 523(a)(4) exists.  This concern is more subtle.  A narrow, status-based 
approach requires any alleged fiduciary relationship to fit within the same category 
as a prototypical, express trust.  Such an approach would eliminate altogether the 
"technical" trust concept and other expansive doctrines like control, ascendancy, 
and the bestowal of trust.  Construing the statutory term "fiduciary capacity" in this 
narrow manner would drastically reduce the number of circumstances in which the 
defalcation exception under section 523(a)(4) would apply.  A construction that is 
too narrow would "eviscerate § 523(a)'s purpose of preventing debtors . . . from 
avoiding, through bankruptcy, the consequences of their wrongful conduct."190  
Using a narrow status-based method in this manner goes against one of the 
philosophies behind the exceptions to discharge in the Bankruptcy Code.  The 
exceptions to discharge in section 523 demonstrate a Congressional decision that 
the interests of certain creditors in recovering debt payment outweigh the interests 
of debtors in obtaining a fresh start.191 The exceptions to discharge can be divided 
into two categories: those based on the type of debt and those based on a debtor's 
bad conduct.  Examples of exceptions that are based on the type of debt are those 
relating to taxes,192 domestic-support obligations,193 government fines,194 
 
despite the relative poverty and newness of America trusts were involved in litigation with a fair measure of 
frequency").  
189 See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844) (stating "[i]f the act embrace such a debt, it will be 
difficult to limit its application. It must include all debts arising from agencies; and indeed all cases where 
the law implies an obligation from the trust reposed in the debtor. Such a construction would have left but 
few debts on which the law could operate"); see also Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U.S. 676, 683–84 (1884) 
(stating "[i]t is, no doubt, true, as said in Chapman v. Forsyth, that a construction of the excepting clauses 
which would make them include debts arising from agencies and the like, would leave but few debts upon 
which the law could operate. At all events, we think that the previous decisions of this court, and of the state 
courts in the same direction, accord with the true spirit and meaning of the act of congress, and with the 
necessities of our business conditions and arrangements").  
190 Ellison v. Ellison (In re Ellison), 296 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that caution should be taken 
to "avoid a construction so narrow as to eviscerate § 523(a)'s purpose of preventing debtors such as the 
[debtor in that case], from avoiding, through bankruptcy, the consequences of their wrongful conduct").  
191 Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222 (1998) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)) 
(stating that "[t]he various exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) reflect a conclusion on the part of Congress 
that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweigh[s] the debtors' 
interest in a complete fresh start"); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964) (noting predecessor 
to section 523(a) "[was] not a compassionate section for debtors" because "it demonstrate[d] congressional 
judgment that certain problems . . . override the value of giving the debtor a wholly fresh start").  
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2012) (certain taxes cannot be discharged debts).  
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educational loans,195 and orders of restitution in criminal cases.196 The very nature 
of these debts is significant enough to outweigh both the public and private interest 
in providing debtors a fresh start.197 Examples of exceptions that arise from certain 
types of reprehensible conduct by a debtor include debts obtained by false pretenses 
or actual fraud,198 embezzlement,199 larceny,200 willful and malicious injury by the 
debtor to another,201 or death or injury caused by the debtor's operation of a vehicle 
while being intoxicated.202 
Historically, it was not clear if the discharge exception for "defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity" should be characterized as falling in the "type of 
debt" or "bad conduct" category.  Before Bullock, one circuit court ultimately 
concluded that defalcation by a fiduciary was a "bad conduct" discharge exception, 
but noted that "[i]t is arguable that defalcation by a fiduciary fits into [the] 'type of 
debt' category."203 Scholars took both sides of the issue.204 Bullock's imposition of a 
mental state clearly placed the section 523(a)(4) exception in the "bad conduct" 
category.205 Bullock emphasized "the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary 
behavior"206 instead of the existence of a debt arising from a fiduciary relationship.  
In addition, when explaining the considerations that led to requiring a mental 
standard for defalcation, the Bullock Court stated that its interpretation was 
"consistent with a set of statutory exceptions that Congress normally confines to 
circumstances where strong, special policy considerations, such as the presence of 
 
193 See id. § 523 (a)(5) (certain domestic support obligations cannot be discharged debts). 
194 See id. § 523 (a)(7) (certain government fines cannot be discharged debts). 
195 See id. § 523 (a)(8)(a)(i) (certain educational loans cannot be discharged debts). 
196 See id. § 523 (a)(13) (certain orders of restitution cannot be discharged debts). 
197 See John M. Czarnetzy, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of The Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 393, 405 (2000) (discussing an entrepreneurial theory behind the bankruptcy discharge); Adam 
Feibelman, Defining The Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
129 (2005) (discussing the function of bankruptcy as social insurance).  
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (stating "a discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt . . . for money, property, services . . . to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or 
actual fraud").  
199 See id. § 523(a)(4) (stating "a discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . 
for . . . embezzlement").  
200 See id. (stating "a discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for . . . 
larceny"). 
201 See id. § 523(a)(6) (stating "a discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . 
for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity").  
202 See id. § 523(a)(9) (stating "a discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . 
for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such 
operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated").  
203 Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis) 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002).  
204 See Johnson, supra note 18, at 119 ("Section 523(a)(4) is probably more like fault-based exceptions, in 
that it contains language that suggests dishonesty on the part of the debtor."); Rosen, supra note 18, at 87 
(asserting the defalcation exception applies only when there is a failure to remit or account for funds or 
property held in an express or technical trust and that the debtor's type of mental state does not matter).  
205 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013) (holding that "[defalcation] 
includes a culpable state of mind requirement . . . involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect 
to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior"). 
206 Id. at 1757 (emphasis added).  
34 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 1 
 
 
 
fault, argue for preserving the debt, thereby benefiting, for example, a typically 
more honest creditor."207 Thus, the exception to discharge in section 523(a)(4) is 
one based on the bad conduct of the debtor.208 This conclusion should affect how 
the term fiduciary capacity in section 523(a)(4) is construed and the appropriate 
method to be used to identify it.  If courts only use a narrow status-based method to 
identify fiduciary relationships, it creates the unintended and unwanted consequence 
of similar bad conduct by a debtor being treated differently.  In other words, the 
same bad conduct by a debtor is discharged in certain circumstances but excepted 
from discharge in others.  The following three hypotheticals are instructive. 
The first hypothetical involves a trust.  Assume a woman named Tina is a 
trustee of a prototypical express trust.  The trust res is $100,000 in cash.  At the time 
the trust was created, the cash was placed in a deposit account and Tina, as trustee, 
was named as the customer with respect to the deposit account.  Under the trust 
instrument, Tina was required to use the trust res only for education and living 
expenses of Ben, the sole beneficiary of the trust.  Instead, Tina spent the money on 
herself to pay for an extravagant vacation.  Assume Tina's violation of the trust 
instrument and applicable duties as trustee amounted to a defalcation under 
Bullock.209 Assume further that Tina subsequently filed bankruptcy and Ben sought 
to have his claim for $100,000 against Tina excepted from discharge under section 
523(a)(4).  Under the current judicial framework, courts in every circuit would 
conclude that Tina's debt to Ben was excepted from discharge because it is settled 
law in every circuit that a trustee of an express trust acts in a fiduciary capacity 
under section 523(a)(4). 
The second hypothetical involves an agency relationship between an attorney 
and a client.  Assume a woman named Anna is an attorney.  Carl is Anna's client.  
Anna is representing Carl in connection with the sale of Carl's real estate.  Carl 
granted Anna a written power of attorney to sell Carl's real estate to a purchaser for 
a purchase price that reflects the property's fair market value.  At the time, the fair 
market value of the property was approximately $100,000.  In violation of these 
instructions, Anna decided to convey the real estate to her brother.  In exchange for 
the deed, Anna's brother took her on an extravagant vacation.  Assume Anna's 
conveyance of the property to her brother amounted to a defalcation under 
Bullock.210 Assume further that Anna subsequently filed bankruptcy and Carl sought 
to have his claim for $100,000 against Anna excepted from discharge under section 
523(a)(4).  Under the current judicial framework, the circuits would be split on this 
issue.  Some would identify Anna's relationship with Carl as a fiduciary capacity 
 
207 Id. at 1761 (emphasis added).  
208 See id. at 1759 (noting that bad conduct includes acts involving "bad faith, moral turpitude, other 
immoral conduct . . . [and] intentional wrongs set forth in the Model Penal Code").  
209 See id. at 1757 (describing state of mind required for defalcation as "one involving knowledge of, or 
gross recklessness in respect to, the proper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior"). 
210 See id.  
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because of the inherent characteristics of an attorney-client relationship.211 Others 
would highlight the nature of the relationship as being a mere agency, note that 
Anna never took title (legal or equitable) to the real property and was not acting as a 
trustee, and consider the relationship to not be a fiduciary capacity under section 
523(a)(4).212 
The third hypothetical involves a lending relationship between a secured party 
and a borrower.  Assume a person named Luke is a lender.  Bob borrowed $100,000 
from Luke with interest accruing at an agreed upon rate.  Bob used the loan 
proceeds to buy equipment.  The loan was secured by a security interest in favor of 
Luke in Bob's equipment.  The security agreement between Luke and Bob allowed 
Bob to retain possession of and use the equipment and prohibited Bob from selling 
it unless the loan was fully paid.  In violation of the security agreement, Bob sold 
the equipment to a buyer who took possession of the equipment and fled the 
country.  Bob spent the sale proceeds on himself to pay for an extravagant vacation.  
Bob did not repay any of the loan to Luke.  Assume Bob's sale of the equipment and 
use of the sale proceeds was a defalcation under Bullock.213 Assume further that 
Bob subsequently filed bankruptcy and Luke sought to have his claim for $100,000 
against Bob excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(4).  Under the current 
judicial framework, the circuits would hold that a typical lending relationship 
between a lender and borrower is not a fiduciary capacity under section 
523(a)(4).214 
Even though the wrongful conduct of the debtors in all three hypotheticals was 
similar, courts using a narrow status-based method for identifying a fiduciary 
capacity would hold that the debt in the trust hypothetical was excepted from 
discharge and a few might find the attorney-client relationship sufficient to except 
the debt from discharge in the agency hypothetical.  This result goes against the 
philosophy of the exceptions to discharge that are based on the bad conduct of the 
 
211 See Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Hayes (In re Hayes), 183 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding "the attorney-client relationship, without more, constitutes a fiduciary relationship within the 
meaning of Section 523(a)(4)"); Tudor Oaks Ltd. P'ship v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 984 
(8th Cir. 1997) (stating "an attorney-client relationship is the type of relationship for which the attorney's 
breach of fiduciary duties to the client may give rise to a finding of a 'defalcation' within the meaning of 
§523(a)(4)").  
212 See Cal-Micro, Inc. v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 329 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a 
debtor was not a fiduciary under section 523(a)(4) because "California case law has consistently held that 
while officers possess the fiduciary duties of an agent, they are not trustees with respect to corporate 
assets"); In re Honkanen, 446 B.R. 373, 381 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (finding Honkanen did not hold any 
property in trust and "[i]n the absence of a trust res, a fundamental requirement to form a trust, there was no 
express, technical or statutory trust formed" and thus no fiduciary capacity).  
213 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013). 
214 See Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 375 (1891) (noting "[t]he relation created was merely the usual 
one of contract between debtor and creditor" and was not created by a person while acting in a fiduciary 
character); Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(holding "an ordinary principal-agent or buyer-seller relationship, without more, is not a fiduciary 
relationship under section 523(a)(4)").  
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debtor.  Based solely on the wrongdoing, which section 523(a)(4) is supposed to be 
about, there is no justifiable difference between the hypotheticals. 
A narrow status-based method requires an express trust relationship, which 
means there must be title to the trust res vested in a trustee.  Yet, there are numerous 
fiduciary relationships, like the second hypothetical, where it is not property but 
power that is conveyed to the fiduciary.  If the exception to discharge is supposed to 
be based on a debtor's bad conduct, then requiring title to be vested in the debtor 
seems irrelevant.  One modern-day example is directors of a corporation.  Directors 
occupy a trustee-like position.215 But unlike trustees, directors do not themselves 
have legal ownership interests in property beneficially owned by another.  But like 
trustees, directors are entrusted with power to use in the interest of another.  The 
current judicial framework creates the potential for non-trustee debtors who have 
engaged in sufficiently bad conduct (defalcation) to discharge debts that Congress 
has identified should be excepted from discharge.  In a bankruptcy context, the 
status-based method of requiring an express trust should not be followed because it 
is inflexible and results in inconsistent treatment of similar bad conduct by debtors. 
 
C. The Problem With Using The Context-Based Method To Determine Fiduciary 
Capacity in Section 523(a)(4) 
 
The context-based method is too flexible and, depending on the fiduciary 
characteristics that are used, results in every relationship containing any fiduciary 
aspect as being classified as fiduciary in nature.  The hallmark of the context-based 
method is a factual context that indicates fiduciary characteristics.  One problem 
with the context-based method is selecting the appropriate fiduciary characteristics.  
For the present purpose of examining the context-based method, this Article will 
assume the following broad array of fiduciary characteristics: (i) the entrustment of 
power or property to the fiduciary,216 (ii) the fiduciary has authority or discretionary 
ability to exercise, control, or use the entrusted power or property,217 (iii) 
 
215 See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 177, at 880–81 (stating "the corporate form of business 
organization proved to be fertile ground for application and development of fiduciary principles").  
216 FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 175, at 4.  
217 This often arises from a fiduciary's skill, training, knowledge, or abilities.  
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vulnerability of a person other than the fiduciary arising from the entrustment,218 
and (iv) obligations of the fiduciary to another that relate to the entrustment.219  
A context-based method using the above characteristics will identify more 
fiduciary relationships than a status-based method because the attributes being 
evaluated are broader than conventionally-recognized categorical forms such as 
those of a principal-agent or trustee-beneficiary.  The focus of the context-based 
method is on the attributes of the relationship and whether it is fiduciary in nature.  
The failing of the context-based method is that it is overly-inclusive for purposes of 
section 523(a)(4).  The hypotheticals illustrate its virtue and weakness. 
Under a context-based method, courts would conclude that the trust 
hypothetical involves a fiduciary relationship because (i) the $100,000 in cash was 
an entrustment of property to Tina, (ii) Tina had the ability to use the cash (and did 
so), (iii) Ben was vulnerable because his transfer of the cash to Tina exposed him to 
risk, and (iv) Tina was obligated to only use the cash for Ben's education and living 
expenses.  In the trust hypothetical, the conclusion is the same under both the status-
based and context-based methods.  Tina would be deemed to have been acting in a 
fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4). 
The agency hypothetical has a different result under the context-based method.  
Under this method, courts would conclude that the agency relationship is a fiduciary 
relationship because (i) the power of attorney to convey the real property was an 
entrustment of power to Anna, (ii) Anna had the ability to exercise the power of 
attorney and convey the real property (and did so), (iii) Carl was vulnerable because 
his transfer of a power to convey to Anna exposed him to risk, and (iv) Anna was 
obligated to convey the property in exchange for payment of the fair market value.  
In the agency hypothetical, the conclusion under the context-based method is 
different than under the status-based method because the context-based method 
avoids the requirement that the debtor have title to the real property. 
Depending on how broadly the characteristics are construed, the lending 
hypothetical may also be considered a fiduciary relationship under the context-
based method because (i) Bob the borrower was entrusted with property (the 
$100,000 in loan proceeds and possession of the equipment that was subject to 
 
218 Vulnerability includes exposure to risk or susceptibility to harm. This would include the dependence of 
a party on the fiduciary. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 810 (1983) (stating a 
fiduciary relationship "may expose the entrustor to risk even if he is sophisticated, informed, and able to 
bargain effectively. Rather, the entrustor's vulnerability stems from the structure and nature of the fiduciary 
relation. The delegated power that enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the 
entrustor, because the purpose for which the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is narrower than 
the purposes for which he is capable of using that power"). See also Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An 
Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 735 
(1994); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 284 (2011) (stating "[t]he 
distinctive quality of the vulnerability is a matter of degree, not kind"); Smith & Lee, supra note 185, at 620 
(explaining how a fiduciary's discretion places the other party in a vulnerable position).  
219 The paramount duty is that of loyalty—the fiduciary's obligation to pursue the interests of another when 
executing a fiduciary mandate. See Miller, supra note 162, at 977 (stating "[t]he boundaries of fiduciary 
obligation are poorly defined, but there is consensus on its essence. At the core lies the cardinal fiduciary 
duty of loyalty").  
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Luke's security interest), (ii) Bob had the discretionary ability to use and control the 
equipment (and did so), (iii) Luke was vulnerable because of his delivery of the 
loaned money and Bob's possession of the equipment, and (iv) Bob was obligated to 
not sell the equipment and to repay the loan.  In the lending hypothetical, a liberal 
application of the context-based method could result in Bob being treated as a 
fiduciary in his relationship with Luke.220 
As shown by these hypotheticals, the context-based method treats similar 
fiduciary characteristics equally, regardless of whether the form of the relationship 
is a prototypical trust or something else.  But the context-method has two 
shortcomings.  First, there is no distinct and exclusive list of the "correct" fiduciary 
characteristics to use when analyzing a relationship.221 Second, even if such a list 
existed, taken alone, those characteristics would be unable to distinguish among 
varying fiducial degrees.  In other words, if all relationships were ordered on a 
continuum, one end would have relationships that are completely fiduciary while 
the other end would be those that have no fiduciary aspect.  The utility of the 
context-based method is limited to identifying whether a relationship has any 
fiduciary aspect, whether small or great.  It is not able to accurately sort fiduciary 
relationships by degree on a principled basis.  It cannot be used to separate two 
fiduciary relationships where one is completely fiduciary and the other has only 
limited aspects that are fiduciary. 
The problem with applying the context-based method using an all-
encompassing list of fiduciary characteristics is just that—the method becomes all-
encompassing.  In the context of a section 523(a)(4) analysis in bankruptcy, using 
 
220 This result would be contrary to existing law. See Buxcel v. First Fidelity Bank, 601 N.W. 2d 593, 603 
(S.D. 1999) (Konenkamp, J., dissenting) (stating "[i]n the ordinary lender-borrower relations, therefore, no 
fiduciary duty exists"); United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997 
(observing "[t]he virtually unanimous rule is that creditor-debtor relationships rarely give rise to a fiduciary 
duty"). But cf. Hunt, supra note 218, at 768 (proposing fiduciary obligations be recognized in the servicing 
stages of lender-borrower relationships, but excluded from the arm's-length negotiation stage). 
221 See Sealy, supra note 82, at 78 (stating "[t]he word 'fiduciary,' we find, is not definitive of a single class 
of relationships to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply . . . It is obvious that we cannot proceed 
any further in our search for a general definition of fiduciary relationships"); see also DeMott, Beyond 
Metaphor, supra note 177, at 908 (observing that "[l]egal commentators have made several attempts to 
develop general justifications for fiduciary obligation; that is, to describe in a comprehensive and analytic 
fashion those aspects of relationships that justify imposition of fiduciary constraints. . . . In part, fiduciary 
obligation eludes theoretical capture because it arises in diverse types of relationships. . . . The scope of the 
fiduciary's obligation, as well as the obligation's precise formulation, necessarily varies with the context of 
the relationship"); DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 177, at 935–36 (explaining that "[t]he 
difficulty is that the characteristics of even the standard or conventional fiduciary relationships—these 
include trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, lawyer-client, guardian-ward, director-corporation, and partner-
fellow partner and partnership—are too varied to enable one to distill a single essence or property that 
unifies all in any analytically satisfactory way"); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 104, at 438 (claiming 
there is nothing "special about fiduciary relations" and that "[s]earching for the right definition of a fiduciary 
duty is not a special puzzle . . . there is no subject here, and efforts to unify it on a ground that presumes its 
distinctiveness are doomed"); Rotman, supra note 177, at 941 (stating "[r]ather than defining fiduciary law 
by the more rigid and rule-oriented scheme of contract law or other common law schemes giving rise to civil 
obligation, fiduciary law ought to be understood by reference to the broad postulates that underlie it and give 
it meaning").  
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an all-encompassing context-based method would be over-inclusive and encompass 
every possible fiduciary relationship under state law.  This creates the very situation 
the Supreme Court in Chapman was concerned about—a situation where the 
exception threatens to swallow the rule.222 The competing bankruptcy policies 
would become out of balance and the discharge restrictions would absorb the fresh 
start.  In an un-modified state using broad characteristics, the context-based method 
should not be used to determine if a relationship is a fiduciary capacity under 
section 523(a)(4). 
 
D. Modifying the Context-Based Method to Require Both Ascendancy and Loyalty 
is a Better Approach 
 
The status-based method is inflexible, distinguishes relationships on a basis that 
is not justified, and goes against the underlying policy of section 523(a)(4).  Courts 
should stop interpreting the term "fiduciary capacity" in section 523(a)(4) to require 
the debtor to be acting as a trustee.  The context-based method is too flexible and, 
depending on the fiduciary characteristics that are used, is overly-inclusive, 
resulting in every relationship containing any fiduciary aspect as being classified as 
fiduciary in nature. 
The proper framework should be flexible enough to avoid the categorical 
constraints of the status-based method but not so loose that it encompasses 
relationships that possess a trivial amount of fiduciary characteristics.  A better 
approach is to take the focus on fiduciary characteristics from the context-based 
method and combine it with criteria that ensures the relationship is genuinely 
fiduciary in nature.  Accordingly, I propose a fiduciary capacity under section 
523(a)(4) requires a relationship in which the debtor (the fiduciary) has a substantial 
degree of ascendancy in relation to another (the beneficiary), who reasonably 
expects the debtor's loyalty as a primary purpose of the relationship.  Ascendancy 
and loyalty are indispensable elements of a genuine fiduciary relationship. 
 
1.  A Substantial Degree of Ascendancy 
 
Ascendancy requires the debtor to have had a superior, influential or 
dominating position over another at the time of defalcation.  Of course, a fiduciary 
usually does not literally have an ascendant position over the person of the 
beneficiary, but rather over something belonging to the beneficiary, such as power 
or property.223 A debtor's position of ascendancy may arise from a debtor being 
entrusted with power or property.  It may also come from other sources such as 
 
222 See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1844) (discussing implications of interpreting the 
statute in an overly-broad manner). 
223 In the context of a physician-patient relationship such as a surgeon, an ascendant position may be 
literally over the physical body of the beneficiary.  
40 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 1 
 
 
 
control, knowledge, vulnerability, influence, training, skill, or ability.224 Requiring 
ascendancy avoids the narrowness of the status-based method's traditional 
categories and provides flexibility to enable a court to analyze the true 
characteristics of a new relationship that is being alleged to be a fiduciary capacity.  
The reason for requiring a substantial degree of ascendancy is to exclude 
relationships that only involve a minimal amount of ascendancy.  The substantiality 
requirement helps avoid the all-encompassing feature that is the weakness of the 
unmodified context-based method. 
 
2.  Reasonable Expectations of Loyalty 
 
Although it is commonly thought of as a duty, loyalty is the other essential 
characteristic of a fiduciary relationship.225 There should be a reasonable and 
justifiable expectation that the debtor will act in the interests of another in and for 
the purposes of the relationship.226 An assessment of reasonableness includes 
 
224 Section 815(b) of the Uniform Trust Code provides:  
 
[t]he exercise of a power is subject to the fiduciary duties prescribed by this [Article] . . 
. [Interestingly, the Comment states:] A power differs from a duty. A duty imposes an 
obligation or a mandatory prohibition. A power, on the other hand, is a discretion, the 
exercise of which is not obligatory. The existence of a power, however created or 
granted, does not speak to the question of whether it is prudent under the circumstances 
to exercise the power. 
 
UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 815 cmt. b (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2000) 
(amended 2010); Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 
2011) (stating the non-dischargeability standard could be met where a fiduciary relationship "involved a 
difference in knowledge or power giving one party a position of ascendancy over another"); Texas Lottery 
Comm'n v. Tran (In re Tran), 151 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d at 1116 
(stating "a true fiduciary relationship involves a difference in knowledge and power between the fiduciary 
and beneficiary, in which the former assumes 'a position of ascendancy over the latter'"); In re Marchiando, 
13 F.3d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[i]f we probe more deeply the distinction between the 
fiduciary relation that imposes real duties in advance of the breach and the fiduciary relation that does not 
we find that the first group of cases involve a difference in knowledge or power between fiduciary and 
principal which, . . . gives the former a position of ascendancy over the latter"). 
225 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) 
(explaining that "[d]espite the differences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various 
fiduciaries, one characteristic is common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty 
to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship"); Scott, supra note 178, at 
541 (stating "[s]ome fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly more intense than others. The greater the 
independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. Thus, a 
trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a 
corporate director who can act only as a member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors 
in a new corporation. All of these, however, are fiduciaries and are subject to the fiduciary principle of 
loyalty, although not to the same extent").  
226 See DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 177, at 938–39 (noting that "[a]ssessing whether a 
plaintiff's expectations of loyalty are justifiable is related to, but not identical to, assessing whether they are 
reasonable"); Finn, supra note 178, at 94 (stating that "[w]hat in the end one is seeking to identify is a 
relationship in which one party has in fact relaxed, or is justified in believing he can relax, his self-interested 
vigilance or independent judgment because, in the circumstances of the relationship, he reasonably believes 
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consideration of the specific circumstances of the relationship as well as industry 
customs and social norms.  Loyalty requires a relationship in which the debtor puts 
the interests of another above his or her own.227 To some extent, loyalty involves 
acting selflessly for the benefit of another, but it is not accurately described as 
purely selfless because the fiduciary often receives some benefit from the 
relationship.228 One scholar explained that loyalty requires the fiduciary to "refrain 
from self-interested behavior that constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary as a result 
of the fiduciary exercising discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical 
resources."229 Although it would be impractical to literally require the fiduciary to 
pursue the sole interests of the other person, it should require the fiduciary to act in 
their best interests.230 Requiring the relationship to have loyalty as a primary 
purpose helps distinguish among varying degrees of fiduciary relationships and 
provides a method to consistently exclude relationships on a principled basis.  The 
loyalty requirement helps identify relationships that seem fiduciary-like because of 
the presence of ascendancy—but in substance are not a true fiduciary species.  A 
real fiduciary has the interests of another as primary. 
The three hypotheticals illustrate the utility of defining a fiduciary capacity 
under section 523(a)(4) to require a relationship in which the debtor (the fiduciary) 
has a substantial degree of ascendancy in relation to another (the beneficiary), who 
reasonably expects the debtor's loyalty as a primary purpose of the relationship. 
In the trust hypothetical, the trustee Tina had a substantial degree of ascendancy 
over the beneficiary Ben.  Tina was named as the customer over the deposit account 
containing $100,000.  Tina, not Ben, had the ability to withdraw funds from the 
account.  Tina had power and control over the funds and Ben was vulnerable as a 
result.  Under the trust instrument and common law and statutory duties applicable 
to trustees, the primary purpose of the relationship was for Tina to act in the 
 
or is entitled to assume that the other is acting or will act in his (or in their joint) interests"); Paul D. Finn, 
The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 6 (TG Youdan ed., 1989); Tuch, supra note 
177, at 482 (stating features of a relationship as identifying fiduciary character include "a reasonable 
expectation that a person (the fiduciary) will act in the interests of another in and for the purposes of a 
relationship").  
227 See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2007) ("An agent's duties of 
loyalty also operate with consequences not captured by contract law and tort law principles, consequences 
that both define and reinforce a principal's entitlement to faithful service from its agents."); Frankel, supra 
note 218, at 824. 
228 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 
YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005) (arguing transaction in which there has been conflict or overlap of interest with 
trustee should be sustained); Smith & Lee, supra note 185, at 635 (explaining how courts use industry 
customs and social norms to determine the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries and distinguish the 
appropriate pursuit of self-interest from the inappropriate pursuit of self-interest). 
229 Smith, supra note 162, at 1407 (defining wrong as when fiduciary does something "inconsistent with 
the beneficiary's interest"). 
230 See Langbein, supra note 228, at 932 ("[A] transaction prudently undertaken to advance the best 
interest of the beneficiaries best serves the purpose of the duty of loyalty, even if the trustee also does or 
might derive some benefit."). Contra HANOCH DAGAN & SHARON HANNES, PHIL. FOUND. OF FIDUCIARY L. 
91, 97 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., Oxford University Press 2014) (defending the sole interest 
standard). 
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interests of Ben by using the $100,000 only for Ben's education and living 
expenses.  Even if Tina was entitled to be compensated for her services as trustee, 
the primary or predominant purpose of the relationship was to act in Ben's interests 
over her own.  The conclusion under the ascendancy and loyalty elements is that 
Tina was acting in a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4). 
In the agency hypothetical, the attorney Anna had a substantial degree of 
ascendancy over her client Carl.  Anna was granted a power of attorney to sell 
Carl's real estate.  Although Anna did not own fee simple title to the real estate, she 
did have the power to convey it and Carl was vulnerable as a result.  Under the 
terms of the written power of attorney and common law and statutory duties 
applicable to agents, Anna was required to sell the property only for a purchase 
price that reflected the property's fair market value.  Even though Anna was likely 
charging a fee for her services, the primary purpose of Anna's relationship with Carl 
under the power of attorney was to follow Carl's directions with respect to 
exercising the power of attorney.  The predominant purpose of the relationship was 
not for Anna to seek after her own interests.231 The conclusion under the 
ascendancy and loyalty criteria is that Anna was acting in a fiduciary capacity under 
section 523(a)(4). 
In the lending hypothetical, the result changes when the ascendancy and loyalty 
elements are applied.  The lender Luke certainly had some degree of ascendancy 
over the borrower Bob.  Luke held a security interest in his favor and also had 
contractual rights that prohibited Bob from engaging in certain conduct, like selling 
the equipment before the loan was fully paid.  But Bob was not really vulnerable to 
Luke's security interest or contractual rights unless Bob failed to perform in a 
manner that constituted a default.  From a practical perspective, Bob also had some 
degree of ascendancy over Luke because Bob was in possession of the equipment 
and also had the ability (although wrongful) to refuse to pay Luke.  The relationship 
involved arms-length bargaining.  The true nature of the lending relationship is 
manifested by evaluating the loyalty requirement.  From Luke's perspective, the 
primary purpose of making the loan was not to achieve Bob's best interests.  Luke 
extended the loan to receive the benefit of the interest rate and return on investment.  
From Bob's perspective, the predominant purpose of the loan was not to carry out 
Luke's best interests, but rather to use the loan proceeds for his own purposes of 
acquiring the equipment.  Although each party may have had contractual 
obligations that benefitted the other party, the overall purpose of the relationship did 
not have the best interests of one party as primary.  The conclusion under the 
ascendancy and loyalty criteria is that neither Luke nor Bob were acting in a 
fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4). 
 
231 See Smith & Lee, supra note 185, at 620 ("The difference between independent contractors and 
fiduciaries is that the latter are subject to the additional constraint of the duty of loyalty, which regulates 
their self-interested actions, even when those actions are within the scope of the discretion granted by the 
contract.").  
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The utility of the ascendancy and loyalty criteria is that it can accurately sort 
among relationships and exclude relationships that are not genuinely fiduciary.  But 
a debt is not automatically excepted from discharge simply because a court 
concludes a debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4).  The 
statute also requires defalcation.232 
 
E. The Impact of the Bullock Court's Elevated Defalcation Standard 
 
In May 2013, in Bullock, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 
"defalcation" in section 523(a)(4) and established as a minimum floor the culpable 
state of mind requirement of "recklessly" under the Model Penal Code.233 The 
challenges of implementing Bullock's new defalcation standard are addressed 
elsewhere.234 Prior to Bullock, several courts and commentators had taken the 
position that defalcation was limited to the narrow situation where a fiduciary fails 
to produce entrusted funds.235 Bullock clarified that defalcation "can encompass a 
breach of fiduciary obligation that involves neither conversion, nor taking and 
carrying away another's property, nor falsity."236  
Bullock held that defalcation "includes a culpable state of mind requirement"237 
that involves "knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature 
of the relevant fiduciary behavior."238 It can be satisfied through either (i) "conduct 
that the fiduciary knows is improper,"239 or (ii) "reckless conduct of the kind that 
the criminal law often treats as the equivalent,"240 meaning "the kind set forth in the 
Model Penal Code."241  
Before Bullock established a new meaning of the term defalcation, many courts 
interpreted defalcation in a broad sense and fiduciary capacity in a narrow sense in 
order to comply with the circuit-level standard that exceptions to discharge should 
be construed narrowly.242 Under Bullock, the statutory term "defalcation" is now an 
 
232 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).  
233 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013) (describing recklessly as involving 
"knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior").  
234 See Byington, supra note 18. 
235 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 523.10, at 523-71 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th 
ed. 2015) (stating "'[d]efalcation' refers to a failure to produce funds entrusted to a fiduciary"); Rosen, supra 
note 18, at 51 (arguing "this exception is intended to cover only the failure to remit or account for funds or 
property held in an express or technical trust. It does not cover other fiduciary relationships. It does not 
cover other actions or inactions.").  
236 Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760.  
237 Id. at 1757.  
238 Id.  
239 Id. at 1759.  
240 Id.  
241 Id.  
242 See In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 290 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[w]hile we agree that 
exceptions to discharge under section 523(a) are to be construed narrowly, our interpretation of 'defalcation' 
does not upset this policy in that the Tenth Circuit has interpreted 'fiduciary' narrowly to include only 
individuals operating under an 'express or technical trust'") (quoting In re Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re 
Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1996)); In re Failing, 124 B.R. 340, 344 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (stating 
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elevated standard.243 If the statutory term "fiduciary capacity" is construed 
narrowly, the combined construction of both defalcation and fiduciary capacity may 
nearly eliminate the application of this exception to discharge.  As one bankruptcy 
judge insightfully observed in 1991:  
 
The present interpretation of "defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity," which reads "fiduciary capacity" narrowly but 
"defalcation" broadly, does not further this basic purpose—it 
manages to allow discharge of some heinous abuses of confidence 
which do not happen to involve "technical" trusts, while impeding 
the "fresh start" of some honest but unfortunate (or merely 
negligent) fiduciaries. Bankruptcy purposes would actually be best 
served if "fiduciary capacity" were read broadly … while 
"defalcation" were read narrowly . . . This would allow most 
confidential relationships the benefit of protection, but would limit 
such protection (and the corresponding penalty to debtors) to the 
more heinous breaches of such confidences. This would except 
from discharge most "dishonest" debts, and discharge most 
"honest" ones.244 
 
Preservation of the debtor's fresh start is a firm-standing hallmark of bankruptcy 
law.  But using an excessively narrow interpretation of the term "fiduciary capacity" 
in order to further the fresh start causes a disproportionate imbalance of the 
competing policy in favor of the discharge restrictions.  Instead, as the Supreme 
Court requires, exceptions to discharge “should be confined to those plainly 
expressed.”245  The fresh start rationale should not be used to construe statutory 
language in a manner that "make[s] a mockery"246 of the "defalcation while acting 
in a fiduciary capacity" exception to discharge.247 If this exception to discharge is 
snuffed out of existence by an unreasonably narrow construction, debtors who are 
truly dishonest or have engaged in sufficiently wrongful conduct (defalcation) will 
have debts discharged that should not be. 
 
 
that although "defalcation" is defined broadly, "fiduciary capacity" is defined narrowly); In re Frick, 207 
B.R. 731, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997) ("The narrow interpretation of fiduciary with the broad interpretation 
of defalcation ensures that the window of liability opens infrequently."); In re Brown, 131 B.R. 900, 904 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (recognizing that "defalcation" is defined broadly but "fiduciary capacity" is defined 
narrowly); In re Gans, 75 B.R. 474, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognizing that "defalcation" is defined 
broadly while "fiduciary capacity" is defined narrowly).  
243 See In re Pearl, 502 B.R. 429, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (indicating Bullock had imposed a 
"heightened level of scienter" when defining defalcation under section 523(a)(4)).  
244 In re Turner, 134 B.R. 646, 659 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).  
245 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013) (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 
U.S. 57, 62 (1998)). 
246 In re Kalinowski, 482 B.R. 334, 344 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012).  
247 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).  
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CONCLUSION 
Although the discharge of debt is a primary purpose of bankruptcy law, the 
discharge restrictions should be construed in a manner that recognizes both the fresh 
start and discharge restriction policies.  The Supreme Court's guidance on the 
meaning of the term fiduciary capacity is inadequate and the circuit courts are 
hopelessly divided.  Neither the status nor context-based methods identify fiduciary 
relationships in a manner that is consistent with bankruptcy policy. 
The Bullock Court's recent elevation of the defalcation standard calls for a 
recalibration of the way the statutory terms "defalcation" and "fiduciary capacity" 
are construed in order to maintain an appropriate balance between competing 
bankruptcy policies.  Now that Bullock has significantly elevated the term 
defalcation, courts should stop construing the term fiduciary capacity narrowly.  
The new framework proposed in this Article provides a way for courts to do so in a 
principled and consistent manner.  Consequently, a fiduciary capacity under section 
523(a)(4) should require a relationship in which the debtor (the fiduciary) has a 
substantial degree of ascendancy in relation to another (the beneficiary), who 
reasonably expects the debtor's loyalty as a primary purpose of the relationship. 
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